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Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory
Chris Guthriet
This Article uses an often-overlooked component of prospect theory to develop a positive
theory of frivolous or low-probability litigation. The proposed Frivolous Framing Theory posits
that the decision frame in frivolous litigation induces risk-seeking behavior in plaintiffs and risk-
averse behavior in defendanta Because plaintiffs in frivolous litigation have a greater tolerance for
risk than the defendants they have sued, plaintiffs in frivolous litigation have "psychological lever-
age" in settlement negotiations, which is likely to lead to plaintiff-friendly settlements or bargaining
impasse. Thi in turn, suggests that reformers concerned about frivolous litigation should target
reform efforts at plaintiffs' decisionmaking in frivolous suit&
INTRODUCTION
Frivolity has its place, but apparently not in litigation. Nothing
about the civil justice system raises the ire of politicians, judges, law-
yers, legal academics, public interest groups, and the public quite like
"frivolous litigation."'
While it is not at all clear that this ire is well placed,2 it is clear
that many of the civil justice system's primary players and spectators
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' See, for example, John Lande, Failing Faith in Litigation? A Survey of Business Lawyers'
and Executives' Opinions, 3 Harv Neg L Rev 1, 26 (1998) (reporting that 53 percent of inside
counsel and 14 percent of outside counsel in his survey believe that more than half of the cases
filed against businesses are frivolous); Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U Pa L Rev
519, 520 (1997) ("[T]here is widespread belief that frivolous litigation is out of control. Many
people cite frivolous suits as the cause of the litigation system's most serious ills-huge case
backlogs, long delays and high trial costs."); Valerie P. Hans and William S. Lofquist, Jurors'
Judgments of Business Liability in Tort Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate,
26 L & Soc Rev 85,95 (1992) (reporting survey results showing that 83 percent of jurors in cases
involving business defendants either "agree" or "strongly agree" that there are far too many
frivolous lawsuits); John W. Wade, On Frivolous Litigation: A Study of Tort Liability and Proce-
dural Sanctions, 14 Hofstra L Rev 433,433 (1986) ("The problem of frivolous civil litigation has
plagued the common law since the court system became mature and, indeed, prior to that time.
Frivolous lawsuits cause appreciable harm to many persons, and in many ways.").
2 See, for example, Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Jus-
tice, 71 Denver U L Rev 77 (1993) (asserting that the common complaint that "the courts are
brimming over with frivolous lawsuits," like other common complaints about the civil justice sys-
tem, "is false, but in a complicated way"); Herbert M. Kritzer, The English Experience with the
English Rule: How 'Loser Pays' Works What Difference it Makez; and What Might Happen Here
12 n 35 (Institute for Legal Studies 1992) ("I know of no evidence on what proportion of cases
filed are arguably frivolous; the frivolous case debate is sustained primarily through anec-
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are deeply concerned about the persistence of frivolous suits, both be-
cause frivolous suits are "bad" and because the courts cannot ade-
quately process nonfrivolous suits as long as frivolous suits clog the
system.
This concern has led to numerous reform efforts by legisla-
tures and courts over the past couple of decades. Congress has re-
cently enacted securities reform legislation,3 the Advisory Committee
on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has amended Rule 11,4 sev-
eral state legislatures have toughened their sanctions provisions,' and
the Supreme Court has eased procedural law to make summary judg-
ment more readily available. Each of these reforms, in whole or part,
was designed to remedy the frivolous litigation "problem."
dotes."); Herbert M. Kritzer, Let's Make a Deal: Understanding the Negotiation Process in Ordi-
nary Litigation 75 (Wisconsin 1991) (arguing that there is no evidence of large numbers of
frivolous cases involving plaintiffs who sue solely to extort a settlement up to the amount of de-
fendants' costs of responding); Bone, 145 U Pa L Rev at 596 (cited in note 1) (conceding that
"we have no hard empirical evidence bearing on the nature or seriousness of the [frivolous litiga-
tion] problem").
' See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub L No 104-67,109 Stat 737, codi-
fied at 15 USC §§ 77z-1-78u-5 (Supp 1997). See also Report of the Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs Committee, S Rep No 104-98, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (1995), reprinted in 1995 USCCAN
679,689 ("In crafting this legislation, the Committee has sought to strike the appropriate balance
between protecting the rights of victims of securities fraud and the rights of public companies to
avoid costly and meritless litigation. Our economy does not benefit when strike suit artists wreak
havoc on our Nation's boardrooms and deter capital formation.").
I Rule 11 authorizes courts to sanction lawyers, law firms, and parties responsible for pre-
senting an improper submission to the courts. See FRCP 11. Originally enacted in 1937, the Su-
preme Court Advisory Committee on Civil Rules toughened Rule 11 in 1983 to increase its de-
terrent effect on frivolous litigation. See FRCP 11 Advisory Committee Note (1983) ("Greater
attention by the district courts to pleading and motion abuses and the imposition of sanctions
when appropriate, should discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline the litiga-
tion process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses."). According to one commentator, the
1983 amendment to Rule 11 became "the most controversial amendment to the Federal Rules
since their adoption a half-century ago." Carl Tobias, Some Realism About Empiricism, 26 Conn
L Rev 1093,1093 (1994). Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the Advisory Committee amended Rule
11 again in 1993 to soften its impact. See FRCP 11 Advisory Committee Note (1993) (noting that
the 1993 revision "places greater constraints on the imposition of sanctions and should reduce
the number of motions for sanctions presented to the court"). Its central purpose, however, is
still deterrence of frivolous litigation. See FRCP 11(b) and Advisory Committee Note (1993)
(providing that "the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter"); John Shapard, et al, Report of a
Survey Concerning Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1, 3 (Federal Judicial Center 1995)
(explaining that the 1993 amendments "provided that the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is solely
the deterrence of objectionable filings").
' See Byron C. Keeling, Toward a Balanced Approach to 'Frivolous' Litigation: A Critical
Review of Federal Rule 11 and State Sanctions Provisions, 21 Pepperdine L Rev 1067,1073 n 25
(1994) (identifying the numerous state sanction provisions modeled at least in part on the 1983
amendments to Rule 11).
' See Celotex Corp v Catrett, 477 US 317, 323-24 (1986) ("One of the principal purposes of
the summary judgment rule [FRCP 56(c)] is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported
claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish
this purpose."); Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc, 477 US 242,247-48 (1986) ("By its very terms,
this standard [FRCP 56(c)] provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute be-
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Remedying the frivolous litigation problem, of course, requires
reformers to identify or diagnose the litigation behavior they seek to
reform. Only if the reformers have at least some understanding of how
litigants behave in frivolous litigation can they hope to develop
mechanisms that will curb that behavior.
The existing models of frivolous litigation, upon which the re-
formers have at least implicitly relied, assume litigants are "rational
actors" who make risk-neutral8 decisions to maximize the value of liti-
gation outcomes According to these rational actor models, plaintiffs
pursue frivolous claims because they believe they can use cost or in-
formation asymmetries to extort settlements, and defendants decide
whether to settle or defend based on their assessments of the costs
they will incur or on the basis of imperfectly informed assessments of
the merits of plaintiffs' cases.
These rational actor models undoubtedly explain much frivolous
litigation behavior. Unfortunately, however, they rest on the untenable
assumption that the litigants pursuing and defending against frivolous
claims make outcome-maximizing decisions. While litigants may very
well seek to maximize outcomes in frivolous litigation, they are in fact
unlikely to do so because individuals seldom make outcome-
maximizing decisions when faced with the kind of risk and uncertainty
that plague the litigation process.
To explain how individuals actually make decisions under such
risky conditions,'° cognitive psychologists Daniel Kahneman and
tween the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judg-
ment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact."); Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co v Zenith Radio Corp, 475 US 574,586 (1986) ("When the moving party has carried
its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."). See also Samuel Issacharoff and George Loewen-
stein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 Yale L J 73, 74 (1990) (noting that the
Supreme Court's "summary judgment trilogy seems consistent with the spirit of the 1983 revi-
sions to the Federal Rules in encouraging the judiciary to screen as well as adjudicate cases").
7 See Bone, 145 U Pa L Rev at 522 (cited in note 1) (arguing that we "cannot make sound
policy" without "a positive theory of frivolous litigation").
. A decisionmaker who is indifferent between options with identical expected values is risk
neutral. See, for example, A. Mitchell Pollnsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 53 (Little,
Brown 2d ed 1989) (positing that where both parties are risk neutral, risk does not matter).
See notes 51-52.
For decision researchers, the term "risk" refers to decisions leading to "a few known out-
comes, each of which occurs with a specific probability." Zur Shapira, Risk Taking: A Managerial
Perspective 4 (Russell Sage Foundation 1995) (emphasis added). "Uncertainty," by contrast, re-
fers to decisions leading to outcomes where "the probabilities of these outcomes are unknown."
Id (emphasis added). For the classic treatment of risk and uncertainty, see Frank H. Knight, Risk,
Uncertainty and Profit (Houghton Mifflin 1921). Despite the distinction between the terms, re-
searchers often use them interchangeably. See, for example, Lola L. Lopes, Psychology and Eco-
nomics: Perspectives on Risk, Cooperation, and The Marketplace, 45 Ann Rev Psych 197,199 & n
1 (1994) (noting that researchers often use both "risk" and "uncertainty" to refer to the same
choice phenomenon). Thus, "risky choice" is often "the term used conventionally to refer to all
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Amos Tversky have developed a widely accepted account of deci-
sionmaking called "prospect theory.".. The "most distinctive implica-
tion of prospect theory," according to Kalneman and Tversky, is that
individuals tend to exhibit a "fourfold pattern of risk attitudes" when
making risky decisions:2 (1) risk aversion'3 for moderate-to-high-
'4probability gains, (2) risk seeking ' for moderate-to-high-probability
but the most extreme instances of ignorance or ambiguity." Lola L. Lopes, Between Hope and
Fear. The Psychology of Risk, 20 Advances Experimental Soc Psych 255,256 (1987).
" Kahneman and Tversky proposed prospect theory in an article published in Econometrica
in 1979. Daniel Kalmeman and Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory:An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 Econometrica 263 (1979). See also Amos Tversky and Daniel Kalmeman, Rational
Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J Bus S251, S257-60 (1986) (contrasting their descrip-
tive model of decisionmaking with the normative rational actor model); Daniel Kalmeman and
Amos Tversky, Choices, Values; and Frames, 39 Am Psych 341,342-44 (1984) (discussing prospect
theory's application to risky choice); Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, The Psychology of
Preferences, 246 Scientific Am 160 (Jan 1982) (employing prospect theory to analyze how indi-
viduals evaluate risky options and determine the consequences of their choices); Amos Tversky
and Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 Science 453
(1981) (describing prospect theory generally).
Kahneman and Tversky's early work on prospect theory focused on decisionmaking under
conditions of risk, but their most recent work has extended prospect theory to encompass deci-
sionmaking under conditions of uncertainty as well. See Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman,
Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J Risk & Uncertainty
297,298 (1992) (noting that their new version of prospect theory "extends the theory to uncer-
tain as well [as] to risky prospects with any number of outcomes"). They have also extended the
implications of prospect theory to riskless choice. See Amos Tversky and Daniel Kalmeman,
Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q J Econ 1039 (1991). Un-
fortunately, their most recent work on prospect theory is also their final work due to Amos Tver-
sky's recent death. For celebrations of Tversky's contributions, see, for example, Eldar Shafir,
Belief and Decision: The Continuing Legacy of Amos Tversky, 38 Cognitive Psych 3 (1999);
David Laibson and Richard Zeckhauser, Amos Tversky and the Ascent of Behavioral Econom-
ics, 16 J Risk & Uncertainty 7 (1998).
'2 Tversky and Kahneman, 5 J Risk & Uncertainty at 306 (cited in note 11). Although Tver-
sky and Kahneman's work on prospect theory culminated with this observation in their final
piece on prospect theory in 1992, see id, they had observed the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes,
even if they had not used that term, in their earlier work as well. See also note 64. Other scholars
have noted the significance of Tversky and Kahneman's observed fourfold pattern of risk atti-
tudes. See, for example, George Wu and Richard Gonzalez, Curvature of the Probability Weight-
ing Function, 42 Mgmt Sci 1676, 1676 (1996) ("[S]tudies have identified two critical empirical
regularities that any good descriptive model [of decisionmaking] should accommodate: gain-loss
asymmetry and 'nonlinearity in probability.' Together, these two regularities capture the 'four-
fold pattern of risk attitudes': risk aversion for most gains and low probability losses, and risk
seeking for most losses and low probability gains.").
,"A risk averter is defined as one who, starting from a position of certainty, is unwilling to
take a bet which is actuarially fair." Kenneth . Arrow, Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing 90
(Markham 1971). See Kritzer, Let's Make a Deal at 166 n 18 (cited in note 2) ("The technical
definition of risk aversion is that a risk-averse player will accept less than the 'expected value' of
the gamble in lieu of playing the game; that is, given a 50-50 chance at $10, a risk-averse player
will accept something less than $5 in lieu of playing the game.").
" A risk seeker's preference is the opposite of a risk averter's preference. That is, a risk
seeker will reject "a sure thing in favor of a gamble of lower or equal expectation." Kahneman
and Tversky, 39 Am Psych at 341 (cited in note 11).
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losses, (3) risk seeking for low-probability gains, and (4) risk aversion
for low-probability losses.
The first half of prospect theory's fourfold pattern, composed of
risk attitudes #1 and #2, focuses on decisionmaking in the face of
moderate-to-high probability gains and losses. When choosing between
moderate-to-high probability gains and losses with equal expected
values, 1 Kahneman and Tversky have found that individuals make
risk-averse choices when selecting between gains and risk-seeking
choices when selecting between losses. Thus, individuals generally pre-
fer a certain $500 prize to a 50 percent chance at a $1,000 prize, but
would rather face a 50 percent chance at a $1,000 fine than pay a cer-
tain $500 fine.
The second half of the fourfold pattern, composed of risk atti-
tudes #3 and #4, focuses on low-probability gains and losses. When
choosing between low-probability gains and losses with equal ex-
pected values, Kahneman and Tversky have found that individuals
make risk-seeking choices when selecting between gains and risk-
averse choices when selecting between losses. Thus, individuals gener-
ally prefer a 5 percent chance at a $1,000 prize to a certain $50 prize,
but would rather pay a certain $50 fine than face a 5 percent chance at
paying a $1,000 fine.
Legal scholars have used the first half of Kahneman and Tver-
sky's fourfold pattern of risk attitudes to develop an important theory
of litigation behavior. The Framing Theory of Litigation1 6 posits that
litigants, like decisionmakers generally, evaluate decision options rela-
The "expected value of an uncertain future outcome, such as the outcome of a trial, is de-
fined as the value of that outcome if it happens, multiplied by the probability that it will hap-
pen." Bone, 145 U Pa L Rev at 529 (cited in note 1). Expected value calculations "enable deci-
sion makers to determine the sure price equivalent of a gamble." Richard Birke, Reconciling
Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 1999 Utah L Rev 205,211.
" Jeff Rachlinski is the leading proponent of the Framing Theory. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Gains, LoseS and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S Cal L Rev 113 (1996). Other contributors in-
clude Russell Korobkin and Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics and Settlement" A New Look
at the Role of the Lawyer,76 Tex L Rev 77 (1997) (applying the Framing Theory to lawyers' and
clients' evaluations of settlement options); Linda Babcock, et al, Forming Beliefs about Adjudi-
cated Outcomes: Perceptions of Risk and Reservation Values, 15 Intl Rev L & Econ 289 (1995)
(applying the Framing Theory to data obtained from negotiators involved in a hypothetical
product liability case); Russell Korobkin and Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation
Settlement" An Experimental Approach, 93 Mich L Rev 107, 129-42 (1994) (positing that the
framing of an offer will affect settlement rates); Peter J. van Koppen, Risk Taking in Civil Law
Negotiations, 14 L & Human Beh 151 (1990) (providing empirical support for the Framing The-
ory).
Interestingly, Robin Hogarth observed the Framing Theory pattern more than a decade ago.
See Robin M. Hogarth, Judgement and Choice 105 (Wiley 2d ed 1987) ("Prospect theory there-
fore predicts that whereas the plaintiff would settle out of court (i.e. take the safe option), the
defendant would prefer to go to court (i.e. the risky alternative)."); Robin M. Hogarth, Ambigu-
ity and Competitive Decision Making: Some Implications and Tests, 19 Annals Operations Re-
search 31,38-41 (1989) (providing experimental evidence consistent with the Framing Theory).
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tive to the current state of affairs and make risk-averse decisions when
choosing between gains and risk-seeking decisions when choosing be-
tween losses. When deciding whether to settle a case or go forward to
trial, the Framing Theory thus predicts that plaintiffs are likely to pre-
fer the risk-averse option-settlement-because they view both set-
tlement and trial as gains, while defendants are more likely to prefer
the risk-seeking option-trial-because they view both settlement and
trial as losses. Consistent with the first half of the fourfold pattern of
risk attitudes, scholars have amassed a collection of empirical data
demonstrating that the Framing Theory holds true in experimental
settings where plaintiffs and defendants face moderate-to-high prob-
ability gains and losses.17 In other words, the Framing Theory explains
behavior in what we might call "ordinary litigation."
While legal scholars have used the first half of prospect theory's
fourfold pattern of risk attitudes to develop the Framing Theory, they
have ignored the second half of the fourfold pattern, even though it
too may have something important to tell us about litigation behavior.
The second half of the fourfold pattern suggests that individuals facing
low-probability gains are likely to behave in a risk-seeking fashion,
while individuals facing low-probability losses are likely to favor risk
aversion. Assuming this pattern holds true in litigation, plaintiffs pur-
suing low-probability claims are likely to prefer the risk-seeking op-
tion-trial-while defendants are more likely to prefer the risk-averse
option-settlement. Thus, litigant behavior in frivolous litigation-the
quintessential example of low-probability litigation'-is likely to be
diametrically opposed to litigant behavior in ordinary litigation.
This Article uses the second half of prospect theory's fourfold
pattern of risk attitudes to develop a positive theory of frivolous or
low-probability litigation that more accurately explains the behavior
of plaintiffs and defendants embroiled in frivolous suits. The proposed
"Frivolous Framing Theory," which supplements both the rational ac-
tor accounts of frivolous litigation and the Framing Theory's account
of ordinary litigation, consists of two propositions:
First, the Frivolous Framing Theory posits that the decision frame
in frivolous litigation induces risk-seeking behavior in plaintiffs and
risk-averse behavior in defendants. Plaintiffs in frivolous litigation, in
other words, are psychologically inclined toward trial, while defen-
dants in frivolous litigation are psychologically inclined toward set-
tlement.
Second, plaintiffs in frivolous litigation are likely to have an ad-
vantage in settlement negotiations in that they are relatively more risk
See Part II.B.
See Part IMl.A.
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seeking than defendants. Because trial is more attractive to plaintiffs
than defendants, plaintiffs are likely to demand more, and defendants
are likely to offer more, than the expected value of plaintiffs' claims. If
there is sufficient bargaining overlap between plaintiffs' inflated de-
mands and defendants' inflated offers, the litigants in frivolous litiga-
tion will likely settle their disputes for an amount greater than the ex-
pected value of the litigation." If however, there is no bargaining
overlap-if plaintiffs' preference for risk-i.e., trial-exceeds defen-
dants' preference for certainty-i.e., settlement-the litigants are
likely to reach bargaining impasse, resulting in eventual adjudication
of the claims through motion or trial.
Determining that plaintiffs and defendants behave differently in
frivolous litigation than in ordinary litigation is significant for two rea-
sons. First, it is intrinsically valuable to understand how legal actors ac-
tually make decisions in litigation. Rather than rely on intuition, folk
wisdom, or untested models of behavior, legal scholars should try, as
Cass Sunstein observes, "to be as clear as possible on how human be-
ings actually behave.' ' 2 This work, in other words, has positive or de-
scriptive value.
Second, armed with an accurate understanding of the behavior of
legal actors, we are in a better position to inform regulation. In de-
scribing the regulatory implications of the Framing Theory, for in-
stance, Russell Korobkin and Tom Ulen contend that "the legal sys-
tem may wish to focus its efforts on encouraging defendants (rather
than plaintiffs) to settle" because of defendants' risk-seeking tenden-
cies in ordinary litigation.' If it turns out, as I argue it does here, that
risk attitudes are reversed in frivolous litigation, the legal system
should focus its efforts on encouraging plaintiffs (rather than defen-
dants) to settle frivolous lawsuits. This work, then, has normative im-
plications as well.
The Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, I explore the prevailing
rational actor models of frivolous litigation and identify the flaw that
limits their descriptive accuracy. In Part II, I explain prospect theory's
Bargaining overlap is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for settlement because a va-
riety of strategic, psychological, and structural barriers might also prevent the parties from
reaching agreement. See Robert H. Mnookin and Lee Ross, Introduction, in Kenneth J. Arrow, et
al, eds, Barriers to Conflict Resolution 3 (Norton 1995) (identifying various barriers to settle-
ment).
Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U Chi L Rev 1175,1175 n 3 (1997). See
also Jon D. Hanson and Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Mar-
ket Manipulation, 74 NYU L Rev 630,689 (1999) (arguing that "a complex model with realistic
predictive capabilities is far preferable to a simplified model that bears little relationship to ac-
tual behavior").
Russell Korobkin and Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Ration-
ality Assumption from Law and Economics, 89 Cal L Rev (forthcoming 2000).
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fourfold pattern of risk attitudes and examine its implications for liti-
gation behavior generally. In Part III, I propose a psychological ac-
count of frivolous litigation. In it, I articulate my two-pronged Frivo-
lous Framing Theory and report some experimental data supporting
it. In Part IV, I explore why plaintiffs appear to engage in risk-seeking
behavior in frivolous litigation. Finally, in Part V, I identify a regula-
tory approach to frivolous litigation that focuses on deterring plain-
tiffs from filing, and encouraging plaintiffs to settle, frivolous suits.
I. RATIONAL ACTOR AccouNTS OF FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION
The prevailing accounts of frivolous litigation are based on the
economic model of suit and settlement.*" The economic modef posits
that litigants make risk-neutralf (or perhaps risk-averse") decisions to
See, for example, Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 Stan L Rev 497,501 (1991) (noting that the "economic model of how
cases are settled has come to be generally accepted"); Robert D. Cooter and Daniel L. Rubin-
feld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J Econ Literature 1067
(1989) (reviewing the law and economics literature on litigation); George L. Priest and Benjamin
Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J Legal Stud 1 (1984) (presenting an economic
model that predicts which cases settle and which go to trial); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and
Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J
Legal Stud 55 (1982) (proposing an economic model of the litigation process for purposes of as-
sessing legal costs); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J Legal Stud 399 (1973) (using economic theory to understand the civil justice
system's mechanisms for resolving legal disputes); John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Con-
flicts, 2 J Legal Stud 279 (1973) (applying the economic model to the disposition of lawsuits);
William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J L & Econ 61 (1971) (applying the
economic model to cases in the criminal justice system).
The economic model of suit and settlement itself is based on expected utility theory, the
modem era's dominant account of decisionmaking under risk or uncertainty. Expected utility
theory's central tenet is that risk-neutral or risk-averse decisionmakers make decisions to maxi-
mize their expected utility. See, for example, Leonard J. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics 105
(Chapman & Hall 1954) (noting that under expected utility theory a "person always decides in
favor of an act the expected utility of which is as large as possible").
John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern proposed expected utility theory as an idealized
account of how a rational individual would make decisions. See Scott Plous, The Psychology of
Judgment and Decision Making 80 (Temple 1993) ("Von Neumann and Morgenstem proposed
expected utility theory as a 'normative' theory of behavior. That is, classical utility theory was not
intended to describe how people actually behave, but how people would behave if they followed
certain requirements of rational decision making."). For a general discussion, see John von Neu-
mann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton 1944).
Other scholars, however, have developed descriptive expected utility theories in an attempt to
explain actual human decisionmaking. See, for example, Paul J.H. Schoemaker, The Expected
Utility Model: Its Variant4 Purposes, Evidence and Limitations, 20 J Econ Literature 529,537-38
(1982) (identifying seven of nine variants of expected utility theory as descriptive).
See Cooter and Rubinfeld, 27 J Econ Literature at 1076 (cited in note 22) (analyzing both
risk neutrality and risk aversion); Posner, 2 J Legal Stud at 418 n 28 (cited in note 22) ("as-
sum[ing] risk neutrality"); Shavell, 11 J Legal Stud at 58 (cited in note 22) (assuming both plain-
tiffs and defendants are risk neutral); van Koppen, 14 L & Human Beh at 152 (cited in note 16)
("In studies of the decision to settle or to sue, it is usually assumed that parties are risk neutral;
that is, that parties are biased neither towards continuing negotiations nor towards breaking off
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maximize the value of litigation outcomes.2 When deciding whether to
settle a case or go to trial, the economic model predicts that litigants
compare the value of settlement to the expected value of trial and se-
lect whichever of the options promises more value. Because the costs
associated with trial generally exceed the costs of settlement,2 the
economic model predicts that litigants will settle most cases because
settlement is likely to yield the greatest return. Trials result only when
litigants develop divergent views of their cases due to optimism2 or in-
formational asymmetries.2
Building on the core premises of the economic model of suit and
settlement, law and economic scholars have developed two types of
frivolous litigation models: asymmetric cost and asymmetric informa-
tion models.3
negotiations.").
See, for example, Rachlinski, 70 S Cal L Rev at 117 (cited in note 16) (noting that the eco-
nomic models "also allow for risk-averse decisionmaking, since litigants are assumed to maxi-
mize utility and not merely wealth."); W. Kip Viscusi, Product Liability Litigation with Risk Aver-
sion, 17 J Legal Stud 101,103 (1988) (assessing in products liability litigation "how the decisions
to drop and to settle a claim are affected by risk aversion, as well as how risk aversion affects the
settlement amounts").
" See Priest and Klein, 13 J Legal Stud at 4 (cited in note 22) ("According to our model, the
determinants of settlement and litigation are solely economic, including the expected costs to
parties of favorable or adverse decisions, the information that parties possess about the likeli-
hood of success at trial, and the direct costs of litigation and settlement. The most important as-
sumption of the model is that potential litigants form rational estimates of the likely decision.");
Shavell, 11 J Legal Stud at 56-57 (cited in note 22) ("If the plaintiff does decide to bring suit, it is
assumed that he and the defendant will reach a settlement if and only if there exists some set-
tlement amount that both he and the defendant would prefer to going to trial.").
" "Indeed, trial costs are so much greater than settlement costs that many authors choose
the simplifying assumption that settlement costs are nil." Cooter and Rubinfeld, 27 J Econ Lit-
erature at 1075 (cited in note 22).
See Robert H. Gertner, Asymmetric Information, Uncertainty, and Selection Bias in Litiga-
tion, 1993 U Chi Roundtable 75,81 ("[P]arties litigate rather than settle in the optimism model
when they are sufficiently optimistic about the outcome of litigation. They will not settle if the
difference between the net amount the victim expects to receive and the total amount the injurer
expects to pay is greater than the total costs of litigation. That, in essence, is the basic optimism
model of settlement and litigation.").
. See id at 87 (noting that divergent expectations "based on differences in information
rather than on differences in opinion" account for trials according to the asymmetric information
model of litigation); Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go to Tial?: An Empirical Study of Pre-
dictors of Failure to Settle, 49 Case W Res L Rev 315, 323 (1999) ("Asymmetric information
models, also based on divergent expectations by the parties, allow party estimates of outcome to
differ not based on party optimism but based instead on information held by only one party
(asymmetric information), so that one side has a truer estimate of the likely outcome at trial.").
The seminal work on the basic economic model of litigation occurred in the early 1970s
with the publication of the Gould, Landes, and Posner articles. See note 22. The early efforts to
model frivolous litigation occurred in the mid-1980s See, for example, D. Rosenberg and S. Shav-
ell, A Model in which Suits are Brought for their Nuisance Value, 5 Intl Rev L & Econ 3 (1985)
(applying a strategic model of litigation to frivolous suits); I.P.L. P'ng, Strategic Behavior in Suit,
Settlement, and Trial, 14 Bell J Econ 539,548-49 (1983) (same).
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A. Asymmetric Cost Models
Asymmetric cost models assume that both plaintiff and defen-
dant know that plaintiffs claims are frivolous. When a rational plain-
tiff and a rational defendant are both aware that plaintiff's claims are
frivolous, litigation seems unlikely. The rational plaintiff should be re-
luctant to file suit because he recognizes that he is unlikely to recover
anything through trial or settlement, and the rational defendant who
knows that the plaintiffs suit is frivolous is unlikely to respond fa-
vorably to it. Proponents of asymmetric cost models argue, however,
that frivolous litigation is likely to occur even where the litigants are
fully informed because of the litigation costs the civil justice system
imposes on defendants.
The first asymmetric cost model, developed by David Rosenberg
and Steven Shavell," posits that frivolous litigation persists because
the defendant must incur the cost of responding to plaintiff's frivolous
complaint. Given that the defendant must pay the costs of responding,
a rational plaintiff will file a frivolous complaint because he assumes
he will be able to recover a settlement from the rational defendant up
to the amount of the defendant's cost of responding.33 Suppose, for in-
stance, that a rational plaintiff believes he has a 1 percent chance of
recovering $5,000 at trial (a $50 expected trial verdict). Suppose fur-
ther that the plaintiff knows it will cost defendant $500 in legal fees to
file an answer or a motion to dismiss or some other responsive plead-
ing. Given this knowledge, the rational plaintiff will file suit on the
theory that the rational defendant is likely to pay him up to $500 to
settle the claim.' "[T]he plaintiff," in short, "will find it profitable to
file his nuisance claim ... whenever the cost of filing is less than the
defendant's cost of defense."35
Although the Rosenberg-Shavell model may explain frivolous
litigation behavior in cases where defendants have no choice but to
incur substantial response costsM critics contend that the model's ex-
planatory power is limited because defendants' response costs are not
likely to be very high. Avery Katz explains, for instance, that "a defen-
dant who knows a suit to be frivolous can merely respond with a blan-
ket denial of the plaintiff's allegations. This will suffice to avoid a de-
The asymmetric cost models, in other words, are complete information models.
See Rosenberg and Shavell, 5 Intl Rev L & Econ at 3-6 (cited in note 30).
Id at 3.
Id at 4-5.
"Id at4.
See, for example, Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J
Legal Stud 437, 439 (1988) (arguing that the Rosenberg-Shavell model "is applicable only to
situations where the defendant must incur significant responding costs before the plaintiff must
incur any significant litigation costs").
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fault judgment and will shift the burden of the next expenditure back
to the plaintiff. ' '
Lucian Bebchuk proposed a more nuanced asymmetric cost
model.38 According to Bebchuk's model, frivolous litigation persists
because a plaintiff can credibly threaten to go to trial due to the fact
that he incurs litigation costs in stages.39 Once plaintiff has "sunk" suf-
ficient litigation costs at one stage of the proceeding, he can maintain
a credible threat to continue pursuing litigation "by virtue of the small
fraction of the litigation costs that remains to be incurred."' Because
plaintiff and defendant recognize early on that this phenomenon will
occur later in the process, plaintiffs threats have credibility through-
out the process, and defendant has an incentive to take those threats
more seriously than she otherwise might.
4 1
The asymmetric cost models-like the Rosenberg-Shavell and
Bebchuk models-have their flaws, but they provide an important in-
sight into frivolous litigation. According to these models, plaintiffs and
defendants make economically rational decisions to file, settle, and try
frivolous suits based on the costs associated with pursuing and de-
fending against such claims.
B. Asymmetric Information Models
Although the asymmetric cost models provide insight into frivo-
lous litigation, Robert Bone contends that "[f]rivolous litigation is
most likely to occur under conditions of asymmetric information." In
Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation, 10 Intl Rev L
& Econ 3,4 (1990). See also Bone, 145 U Pa L Rev at 538 (cited in note 1) (arguing that in com-
plete information models "the defendant knows all the material facts and need not worry about
preparing for trial, so she should be able to get away with making simple denials"). But see Lisa
Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique of Federal Court-
Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U Pa L Rev 2169 (1993). Bernstein comes to the defense of
the Rosenberg-Shavell-type asymmetric cost model by pointing out that "a legal claim may im-
pose additional costs on the defendant regardless of whether the plaintiff would ultimately pre-
vail." Id at 2203-04. She contends that when a lawsuit imposes a "cloud on title" to an asset held
by defendant, the value of the claim is determined not merely by defendant's costs of responding
but also "by the length of time that the plaintiff can maintain the suit before having a dispositive
judgment entered against him, the cost to the defendant of informing relevant third parties or
the market about the strength of the claim, and the cost to third parties of verifying information
released by the defendant." Id at 2204. "Consequently, it may be rational for the defendant to
settle for an amount that far exceeds his litigation response costs." Id at 2204-05.
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of
Threats to Sue, 25 J Legal Stud 1 (1996).
Id at 4.
Id.
"Id.
Bone, 145 U Pa L Rev at 524 (cited in note 1).
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asymmetric or incomplete information models, one of the parties
knows that the suit is frivolous but the other party does not.43
Most asymmetric information models assume that plaintiff is the
informed party." These "informed-plaintiff models"4 5 posit that frivo-
lous litigation occurs because the plaintiff is able to capitalize on the
private information she possesses about the merits of her suit. In
Katz's version of an informed-plaintiff model, for instance, a rational
plaintiff with a frivolous claim files suit because she knows defendant
does not know whether her claim is frivolous or genuine.4 The rational
defendant, uncertain about the merits of plaintiff's suit, decides
whether to settle or defend based "on his estimate of the probability
that the suit is genuine, as updated by any inferences he can draw
from the plaintiff's decision to bring suit."
Other asymmetric information models assume that the defen-
dant, rather than the plaintiff, possesses private information about the
merits of plaintiff's suit. This situation might arise, for instance, where
plaintiff files suit without adequately investigating the claim, and de-
fendant has full knowledge about the behavior giving rise to the
claim."8 According to Bone's elaborate informed-defendant model, a
prospective plaintiff who is uncertain about the merits of her suit can
assess the merits by conducting a prefiling investigation, by conducting
formal discovery, or by using any settlement offer the defendant
makes as a measure of the merits of her claim. Knowing this, the ra-
tional defendant will make low settlement offers in both meritorious
See id at 537.
The assumption that plaintiff might have private information about the frivolousness of
her case seems reasonable. See Bone, 145 U Pa L Rev at 542 (cited in note 1) ("The informed-
plaintiff model fits a number of different litigation settings-for example, a negligence suit in
which liability turns on contributory negligence and in which the defendant cannot observe the
plaintiff's conduct, or a products liability case in which the plaintiff knows he did not use the de-
fendant's product.").
I borrow the term "informed-plaintiff model" from Robert Bone. See id at 542.
See Katz, 10 Intl Rev L & Econ at 4-5 (cited in note 37).
Id at 5. Bebchuk also advanced an informed-plaintiff model in which a rational defendant
might settle with a rational plaintiff in a frivolous case because the "defendant might be uncer-
tain whether the plaintiff would go to trial" due to "private information" the plaintiff has about
"the expected value to him of going to trial." Bebchuk, 17 J Legal Stud at 440 (cited in note 36).
See also Bruce H. Kobayashi and Jeffrey S. Parker, No Armistice at 11: A Commentary on the Su-
preme Court's 1993 Amendment to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 3 S Ct Econ
Rev 93, 118-37 (1993) (proposing an informed-plaintiff model of litigation with Rule 11 sanc-
tions); A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Sanctioning Frivolous Suits: An Economic
Analysis, 82 Georgetown L J 397, 404-06 (1993) (introducing an informed-plaintiff model for
analyzing plaintiff's decision to sue and defendant's decision to seek sanctions).
See Bone, 145 U Pa L Rev at 550 (cited in note 1) ("Examples include medical malprac-
tice suits in which the patient has no direct knowledge of what the doctor did; antitrust and civil
rights suits that depend on the defendant's intent, motivation or similar state of mind; and securi-
ties fraud class actions that are only thinly investigated in the rush to be the first to file.").
" See id at 550-66.
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and frivolous cases to try to communicate to the plaintiff that her case
lacks merit. Plaintiffs, in turn, will become aware of this behavior and
will thus rely on discovery as the way to assess the merits of their
cases. Defendants will therefore be inclined to make more generous
settlement offers to plaintiffs in both frivolous and nonfrivolous cases
to avoid the costs of discovery.o
Like the asymmetric cost models, the asymmetric information
models present a persuasive account of frivolous litigation. According
to these models, frivolous litigation persists because rational plaintiffs
and rational defendants make decisions about whether to file, settle,
and try frivolous cases under uncertain conditions created by informa-
tional asymmetries.
C. Limits'of the Rational Actor Models of Frivolous Litigation
The existing models-which contend that cost and information
asymmetries are responsible for frivolous litigation-undoubtedly ex-
plain much frivolous litigation behavior. It seems plausible that some
rational plaintiffs file frivolous claims and some rational defendants
decide whether to settle or defend against such claims based on an-
ticipated litigation costs. It also seems plausible that the uncertainty
created by informational asymmetries might account for the frivolous
litigation behavior of some rational plaintiffs and defendants.
What troubles me about the existing models, though, is that they
rest on the highly questionable assumption that plaintiffs and defen-
dants make risk-neutral," economically rational decisions.52 The notion
that plaintiffs and defendants seek to maximize economic outcomes in
litigation is not troubling, but the assumption that they are able to do
so is problematic because research by cognitive psychologists has
demonstrated that this assumption is inaccurate.
See id at 552. Ivan P'ng also proposed an informed-defendant model of frivolous litiga-
tion. See P'ng, 14 Bell J Econ at 540-46,548-49 (cited in note 30).
" See, for example, Bone, 145 U Pa L Rev at 559 n 116 (cited in note 1) (assuming risk neu-
trality); Bebchuk, 25 J Legal Stud at 11 (cited in note 38) (same); Katz, 10 Intl Rev L & Econ at 8
(cited in note 37) (assuming that plaintiff would "accept a settlement if and only if it were at
least as great as his expected gain from trial," but contending that "a plaintiff will always accept
a settlement offer when indifferent"); Bebchuk, 17 J Legal Stud at 441 (cited in note 36) (same);
Rosenberg and Shavell, 5 Intl Rev L & Econ at 6 (cited in note 30) (assuming risk neutrality);
P'ng, 14 Bell J Econ at 542 (cited in note 30) (noting that "litigants are indifferent to risk").
' The "economic models constructed to describe frivolous lawsuits show that settlement de-
cisions are rational and based on a comparison between the settlement offer and the expected
outcome of a trial." Philip M. Nichols, Symmetry and Consistency and the Plaintiffs Risk Partial
Settlement and the Right of Contribution in Federal Securities Actions, 19 Del J Corp L 1, 23 n 115
(1994). See, for example, Bone, 145 U Pa L Rev at 534 (cited in note 1) (noting that all of the
formal models attempt to assess why a "rational" plaintiff would file a frivolous suit); Rosenberg
and Shavell, 5 Intl Rev L & Econ at 3 (cited in note 30) (assuming "that each party acts in his fi-
nancial interest and realizes the other will do the same").
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II. PROSPECr THEORY AND LITIGATION
Cognitive psychologists try to understand how individuals actu-
ally make decisions. To do so, they collect empirical data that they use
to develop descriptive accounts of decisionmaking or "behavioral de-
cision theories."" The leading behavioral decision theory is prospect
theory. Developed by cognitive psychologists Daniel Kahneman and
Amos Tversky, prospect theory demonstrates that individuals do not
make decisions in the "rational" manner assumed by the economic
models, but instead exhibit different risk preferences depending upon
the characteristics of the decision problem.
5
A. Prospect Theory's "Fourfold Pattern of Risk Attitudes"
Prospect theory describes how individuals make decisions under
risky conditions. The theory's "major empirical generalization about
choice under risk" is that individuals exhibit a "fourfold pattern of
" Behavioral decision theory "incorporates empirical observations of judgment and choice
into a model of decisionmaking." Rachlinski, 70 S Cal L Rev at 121 (cited in note 16). For over-
views of the application of behavioral decision theory to law, see Korobkin and Ulen, 89 Cal L
Rev (cited in note 21) (advocating the abandonment of strict adherence to the rationality as-
sumption in law and economics in favor of a more nuanced understanding of human behavior);
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Eco-
nomics, 50 Stan L Rev 1471 (1998) (proposing an approach to the economic analysis of law in-
formed by a more accurate conception of human decisionmaking); Donald C. Langevoort, Be-
havioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review,
51 Vand L Rev 1499 (1998) (analyzing the impact behavioral research on decisionmaking biases
has had on legal scholarship); Sunstein, 64 U Chi L Rev at 1775 (cited in note 20) (outlining the
principal findings of behavioral research and applying them to the law). But see Jennifer Arlen,
Comment, The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 Vand L Rev 1765, 1768
(1998) (arguing that "conventional law and economics can be viewed as the first widely-adopted
behavioral approach to law" and that "behavioral economic analysis of law is not yet-and may
never be-in a position to supplant conventional law and economics"); Mark Kelman, Behav-
ioral Economics as Part of a Rhetorical Due A Response to Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 Stan L
Rev 1577 (1998) (arguing that behavioral law and economics is inevitably interpretive and in-
complete); Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice; Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 Stan L
Rev 1551, 1560-61 (1998) (contending that behavioral law and economics is "merely a set of
challenges to the theory-builders" rather than a theory itself).
' Prospect theory is arguably the most prominent "challenger" to expected utility theory.
See, for example, Rachlinski, 70 S Cal L Rev at 121 (cited in note 16) (referring to prospect the-
ory as "[t]he leading example of a behavioral decision theory model of choice"); Pious, Psychol-
ogy of Judgment at 95 (cited in note 23) (noting that prospect theory is "the most widely ac-
cepted" alternative to expected utility theory).
" See Kabneman and Tversky, 47 Econometrica at 263 (cited in note 11) (noting that human
beings "systematically violate the axioms of expected utility theory"). See also R.J. Herrnstein,
Rational Choice Theory: Necessary but Not Sufficient, 45 Am Psych 356, 357 (1990) (noting that
"[e]xperimental findings by many decision researchers ... have undermined the descriptive form
of the [expected utility] theory by discovering choice phenomena that are consistent with (or at
least not inconsistent with) principles of cognitive psychology, but inconsistent with rationality as
commonly construed").
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risk attitudes." According to prospect theory, "risk attitudes" are a
product of two factors:
First, risk attitudes depend upon whether the individual views the
relevant decision options as "gains" or "losses" from her current posi-
tion.n' Choices between gains tend to induce risk aversion, while
choices between losses tend to encourage risk seeking.!
Second, risk attitudes depend upon whether the individual esti-
mates that uncertain decision options have a "moderate-to-high prob-
ability" or a "low probability" of occurring.59 Individuals are likely to
Tversky and Kahneman, 5 J Risk & Uncertainty at 307 (cited in note 11).
Technically, prospect theory posits that individuals assess the "subjective value" of deci-
sion options. See Tversky and Kahneman, 5 J Risk and Uncertainty at 299 (cited in note 11);
Tversky and Kalmeman, 59 J Bus at S257-58 (cited in note 11); Kahneman and Tversky, 39 Am
Psych at 342 (cited in note 11); Kalmeman and Tversky, 246 Scientific Am at 162 (cited in note
11); Tversky and Kahneman, 211 Science at 454 (cited in note 11); Kahneman and Tversky, 47
Econometrica at 275 (cited in note 11). The subjective value of a decision option is a measure of
that option's deviation from a neutral reference point. Because the subjective value depends
upon the option's relationship to a neutral reference point, options appear to be gains (for ex-
ample, a chance at a dollar prize), losses (for example, a chance at having to pay a fine), or neu-
tral outcomes (for example, zero or status quo). Kahneman and Tversky explain that "[p]eople
do not normally think of relatively small outcomes in terms of states of wealth but rather in
terms of gains, losses, and neutral outcomes (such as the maintenance of the status quo)."
Kahmeman and Tversky, 39 Am Psych at 342. See also Wu and Gonzalez, 42 Mgmt Sci at 1677
(cited in note 12) (identifying a "value function, defined in terms of gains and losses" as one of
the "two essential features of the prospect theory family").
To explain, when decisionmakers choose between options that appear to represent gains-
for example, a certain small dollar prize or a gamble that might yield a much larger prize-they
tend to assign more subjective value to the certain gain than to the gamble. When choosing be-
tween options that appear to represent losses-for example, paying a certain small fine or facing
a chance of paying a much larger fine-decisionmakers tend to assign more subjective value to
the gamble than to the certain loss. Because decisionmakers tend to have value functions that
treat gains and losses this way, they tend to prefer the risk-averse option when choosing between
gains and the risk-seeking option when choosing between losses. See Tversky and Kahneman, 5 J
Risk & Uncertainty at 306 (cited in note 11); Tversky and Kahneman, 59 J Bus at S258-59 (cited
in note 11); Kahneman and Tversky, 39 Am Psych at 341-42 (cited in note 11); Kalneman and
Tversky, 246 Scientific Am at 162 (cited in note 11); Tversky and Kahneman, 211 Science at 454
(cited in note 11); Kahneman and Tversky, 47 Econometrica at 277-79 (cited in note 11).
" Technically, prospect theory posits that individuals assign "decision weights" rather than
"probabilities" to the likelihood a particular outcome will occur. See Tversky and Kahneman, 5 J
Risk & Uncertainty at 299 (cited in note 11); Tversky and Kalmeman, 59 J Bus at S262-63 (cited
in note 11); Kahneman and Tversky, 39 Am Psych at 344-45 (cited in note 11); Kahneman and
Tversky, 246 Scientific Am at 164 (cited in note 11); Tversky and Kahneman, 211 Science at 454
(cited in note 11); Kalmeman and Tversky, 47 Econometrica at 275,280 (cited in noted 11). Like
a probability figure, a decision weight measures "the impact of events on the desirability of" an
uncertain decision option. Kahneman and Tversky, 47 Econometrica at 280. A decision weight,
however, is not merely a probability figure, but rather a function of probability reflecting
Kalmeman and Tversky's empirical observation that individuals tend to weight probabilities dif-
ferently depending upon where they fall on the 0%-100% probability scale. See, for example,
Kahneman and Tversky, 39 Am Psych at 344-45; Kahneman and Tversky, 246 Scientific Am at
164. See also Wu and Gonzalez, 42 Mgmt Sci at 1677 (cited in note 12) (identifying "a probability
weighting function that permits probabilities to be weighted nonlinearly" as one of "two essen-
tial features of the prospect theory family").
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underweight moderate-to-high probabilities,4 which enhances risk
aversion for moderate-to-high probability gains and risk seeking for
61
moderate-to-high probability losses. Individuals are likely to over-
weight low probabilities,2 which induces risk seeking for low-
probability gains and risk aversion for low-probability losses.6
Because options appear to represent "gains" or "losses" that oc-
cur with either "moderate-to-high" or "low" probability, prospect the-
ory identifies four different decision frames: (1) a moderate-to-high-
probability gains frame; (2) a moderate-to-high-probability losses
frame; (3) a low-probability gains frame; and (4) a low-probability
losses frame. 6  Decisionmakers exhibit predictable risk attitudes in
each of these four frames:
See Tversky and Kahneman, 5 J Risk & Uncertainty at 316 (cited in note 11); Tversky and
Kalmeman, 59 J Bus at S263 (cited in note 11); Kahneman and Tversky, 39 Am Psych at 345
(cited in note 11); Kahneman and Tversky, 246 Scientific Am at 164 (cited in note 11); Tversky
and Kabneman, 211 Science at 454 (cited in note 11);
" Kahneman and Tversky explain that "[u]nderweighting of moderate and high probabili-
ties relative to sure things contributes to risk aversion in gains by reducing the attractiveness of
positive gambles. The same effect also contributes to risk seeking in losses by attenuating the
aversiveness of negative gambles." Kahneman and Tversky, 39 Am Psych at 345 (cited in note
11).
See Tversky and Kahneman, 5 J Risk & Uncertainty at 316 (cited in note 11); Tversky and
Kahneman, 59 J Bus at S263 (cited in note 11); Kahneman and Tversky, 39 Am Psych at 345
(cited in note 11); Kahneman and Tversky, 246 Scientific Am at 164 (cited in note 11); Tversky
and Kahneman, 211 Science at 454 (cited in note 11); Kahneman and Tversky, 47 Econometrica
at 280-81 (cited in note 11).
"The overweighting of low probabilities reverses the pattern described above," Kahneman
and Tversky explain. "It enhances the value of long shots and amplifies the aversiveness of a
small chance of a severe loss. Consequently, people are often risk seeking in dealing with im-
probable gains and risk averse in dealing with unlikely losses." Kahneman and Tversky, 39 Am
Psych at 345 (cited in note 11). The overweighting of low-probability gains and losses "contrib-
utes to the appeal of lottery tickets and accident insurance, which are concerned with events that
are highly significant and relatively improbable." Katmeman and Tversky, 246 Scientific Am at
164 (cited in note 11). There is a voluminous behavioral literature on lottery play and insurance
behavior. See, for example, Edward . McCaffery, Why People Play Lotteries and Why It Matters,
1994 Wis L Rev 71 (lottery behavior); John C. Hershey and Paul J.H. Schoemaker, Risk Taking
and Problem Context in the Domain of Losses: An Expected Utility Analysis, 47 J Risk & Ins 111
(1980) (insurance behavior); Paul J.H. Schoemaker and Howard C. Kunreuther, An Experimental
Study of Insurance Decisions, 46 J Risk & Ins 603 (1979) (same); Paul Slovic, et al, Preference for
Insuring Against Probable Small Losses: Insurance Implications, 44 J Risk & Ins 237 (1977)
(same).
. Tversky and Kahneman, 5 J Risk & Uncertainty at 306 (cited in note 11) (identifying the
fourfold pattern). The risk patterns with respect to moderate-to-high probability gains and losses
are more stable than the risk patterns with respect to low-probability gains and losses for three
reasons. First, risk tendency in the face of moderate-to-high probability gains and losses is a
product of both the individual decisionmaker's subjective value function and weighting function.
Id (noting that "the shapes of the value and the weighting functions imply risk-averse and risk-
seeking preferences, respectively, for gains and for losses of moderate or high probability") (em-
phasis added). Risk tendency in the face of low-probability gains and losses, by contrast, is solely
a product of the weighting function. Id (noting that "the shape of the weighting functions favors
risk seeking for small probabilities of gains and risk aversion for small probabilities of loss").
Second, the weighting function is "not well-behaved" near the endpoints of the probability scale.
Framing Frivolous Litigation
First, when confronting a moderate-to-high probability gains
frame, decisionmakers tend to prefer the risk-averse option.6' In their
most recent work on the subject, for instance, Tversky and Kahneman
found that when they asked individuals to choose between a gain with
a 50 percent or greater chance of occurring-e.g., a 50 percent chance
at $500-and the expected value of that gain-i.e., a certain $250-88
percent of decisionmakers preferred the certain gain over the gam-
ble. Decisionmakers generally prefer the risk-averse option in this
moderate-to-high probability gains frame both because they are
choosing between gains and because they are likely to underweight
the 50 percent probability of winning the gamble.67
Second, when decisionmakers face a moderate-to-high probability
losses frame, they tend to prefer the risk-seeking option.Y Again, in
their most recent work on the subject, Tversky and Kahneman found
that when they asked individuals to choose between a loss with a 50
percent or greater chance of occurring-e.g., a 50 percent chance at a
$500 loss-and the expected value of that loss-i.e., a certain $250
loss-87 percent of decisionmakers preferred the gamble.6 Decision-
makers generally prefer the risk-seeking option in this moderate-to-
high probability losses frame both because they are choosing between
losses and because they are likely to underweight the 50 percent
probability of losing the gamble.70
Third, when making decisions in a low-probability gains frame,
decisionmakers tend to prefer the risk-seeking option; 1 rather than the
risk-averse option they are inclined to prefer in the face of higher-
probability gains. Tversky and Kahueman found, for instance, that
when they asked individuals to choose between a gain with a 10 per-
cent or smaller chance of occurring-e.g., a 10 percent chance at
$500-and the expected value of that gain-i.e., a certain $50-78 per-
Tversky and Kahneman, 5 J Risk & Uncertainty at 303 (cited in note 11); Kahneman and Tver-
sky, 47 Econometrica at 283 (cited in note 11). Third, the underweighting of moderate-to-high
probabilities is "more pronounced" than the overweighting of low probabilities. Tversky and
Kahneman, 211 Science at 454 (cited in note 11).
Tversky and Kahneman, 5 J Risk & Uncertainty at 306 (cited in note 11).
Id at 308.
See notes 58, 60. See also Richard Gonzalez and George Wu, On the Shape of the Prob-
ability Weighting Function, 38 Cognitive Psych 129,133,145 (1999) (reporting "[d]ata at both the
aggregate level and the individual level" that "are consistent with the inverse-S-shape weighting
function" proposed by Tversky and Kahneman); Wu and Gonzalez, 42 Mgmt Sci at 1687-88
(cited in note 12) (corroborating and refining Tversky and Kahneman's observation that deci-
sionmakers tend to underweight moderate-to-high probability gains).
See Tversky and Kahneman, 5 J Risk & Uncertainty at 306 (cited in note 11).
Id at 308.
See notes 58,60.
Tversky and Kalmeman,5 J Risk & Uncertainty at 306 (cited in note 11).
See text accompanying note 65.
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cent of decisionmakers preferred the gamble.7 Decisionmakers gener-
ally prefer the risk-seeking option in this low-probability gains frame
because they are likely to overweight the 10 percent probability of
winning the gamble.74
Finally, when facing a low-probability losses frame, decisionmak-
ers tend to prefer the risk-averse option' rather than the risk-seeking
option they are inclined to prefer in the face of higher-probability
losses. When Tversky and Kahmeman asked individuals to choose be-
tween a loss with a 10 percent or smaller chance of occurring-e.g., a
10 percent chance at a $500 loss-and the expected value of that
loss-i.e., a certain $50 loss-they found that 80 percent of decision-
makers preferred the certain loss7 Decisionmakers generally prefer
the risk-averse option in this low-probability losses frame because
they are likely to overweight the 10 percent probability of losing the
gamble. Table 1 presents decisionmakers' predicted risk attitudes in
each of prospect theory's four decision frames.
TABLE 1
PROSPECT THEORY'S FOURFOLD PATTERN
Moderate-to-High Low Probability
Probability
Gains risk aversion risk seeking
Losses risk seeking risk aversion
Because decisionmakers exhibit predictable risk attitudes in each
of these four frames, prospect theory asserts that decisionmakers ex-
hibit a "fourfold pattern of risk attitudes., 7' According to Tversky and
Tversky and Kahneman, 5 J Risk & Uncertainty at 308 (cited in note 11).
See notes 62-63. See also Gonzalez and Wu, 38 Cognitive Psych at 133,145 (cited in note
67) (reporting "[d]ata at both the aggregate level and the individual level ... consistent with the
inverse-S-shape weighting function" proposed by Tversky and Kahneman); Wu and Gonzalez, 42
Mgmt Sci at 1687-88 (cited in note 12) (corroborating and refining Tversky and Kahneman's ob-
servations that decisionmakers tend to overweight low-probability gains); Peter Wakker and
Anne Stiggelbout, Explaining Distortions in Utility Elicitation through the Rank-dependent
Model for Risky Choices, 15 Medical Decision Making 180,183 (1995) (reporting that the over-
weighting of low-probability prospects "has been confirmed in many studies").
Tversky and Kahneman, 5 J Risk & Uncertainty at 306 (cited in note 11).
See text accompanying note 68.
Tversky and Kahneman, 5 J Risk & Uncertainty at 308 (cited in note 11).
See notes 62-63.
Tversky and Kalmeman, 5 J Risk & Uncertainty at 306 (cited in note 11).
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Kahneman, this fourfold pattern is "[t]he most distinctive implication"
of the theory."'
B. The First Half of the Fourfold Pattern and Ordinary Litigation
Legal scholars have used the first half of prospect theory's four-
fold pattern of risk attitudes to describe ordinary litigation behavior.
According to the first half of the fourfold pattern, decisionmakers
faced with moderate-to-high probability gains tend to make risk-
averse choices, while decisionmakers confronted with moderate-to-
high probability losses tend to make risk-seeking choices. Building on
this insight, legal scholars have developed the Framing Theory of Liti-
gation.
The Framing Theory contends that litigation presents different
decision frames to plaintiffs and defendants. Plaintiffs in ordinary liti-
gation get to choose between a certain settlement offer and a moder-
ate-to-high probability of recovering more at trial, while defendants
must choose to pay a certain settlement amount or face a moderate-
to-high probability of losing more at trial.81 For plaintiffs in ordinary
litigation, in other words, litigation appears to represent a moderate-
to-high probability gains frame, so they are likely to exhibit risk aver-
sion. Defendants in ordinary litigation, by contrast, are likely to view
litigation as a moderate-to-high probability losses frame, so they are
likely to exhibit risk-seeking preferences. Thus, the Framing Theory
posits that in ordinary litigation, where plaintiffs and defendants face
at least moderate probabilities of winning and losing at trial, plaintiffs
are likely to prefer settlement, while defendants are likely to prefer
trial* Table 2 presents litigants' predicted risk attitudes in ordinary
litigation.
' Id. Another key premise of prospect theory is "loss aversion," which refers to the phe-
nomenon that "losses generally loom larger than the corresponding gains." Daniel Kahneman
and Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective, in Arrow, et al, eds, Barriers to
Conflict Resolution 44,54 (cited in note 19). In their final work on prospect theory, Tverksy and
Kahneman described the theory's "key elements" as: "1) a value function that is concave for
gains, convex for losses, and steeper for losses than for gains, and 2) a nonlinear transformation
of the probability scale, which overweights small probabilities and underweights moderate and
high probabilities." Tversky and Kahneman,5 J Risk & Uncertainty at 297-98 (cited in note 11).
Their observation that the value function is "steeper for losses than for gains" refers to loss aver-
sion.
" "Litigation," Rachlinski explains, "appears to supply a natural frame." Rachinski, 70 S
Cal L Rev at 129 (cited in note 16). "When deciding whether to settle a case, plaintiffs consis-
tently choose between a sure gain by settling and the prospect of winning more at trial. This
closely resembles a gains frame .... Conversely, defendants choose between a sure loss by set-
tling and the prospect of losing more at trial. This is a choice made in a loss frame." Id.
See Rachlinski, 70 S Cal L Rev at 119 (cited in note 16) (contending that "litigants' risk
preferences will vary systematically, depending upon whether they are in the role of plaintiff or
defendant"); Babcock, et al, 15 Intl Rev L & Econ at 296-97 (cited in note 16) ("A decision task
framed in terms of potential gains typically produces risk averse behavior, whereas a decision
2000]
The University of Chicago Law Review [67:163
TABLE 2
RISK ATrITUDES IN ORDINARY LITIGAION
Decision Frame Risk Attitude Explanation
Plaintiff moderate-to-high risk averse value function &
probability gains underweighting of
probabilities
Defendant moderate-to-high risk seeking value function &
probability losses underweighting of
I I_ I probabilities
Scholars have found ample evidence in experimental settings
demonstrating that plaintiffs facing moderate-to-high probability
gains and defendants facing moderate-to-high probability losses ex-
hibit risk-averse and risk-seeking behavior respectively.n In all of
these problems, however, plaintiff-subjects have either explicitly or
implicitly faced a 30-80 percent chance of winning at trial, and defen-
dant-subjects have either explicitly or implicitly faced a 30-80 percent
chance of losing at trialY In other words, the existing work on Framing
task framed in terms of potential losses will be more likely to yield risk seeking behavior. The
[sic] raises the possibility that plaintiffs, who are facing what may be perceived as gains, will ex-
hibit risk aversion, whereas defendants, who may perceive potential losses, will be (relatively)
more risk seeking."); Korobkin and Guthrie, 93 Mich L Rev at 109 (cited in note 16) ("[W]e pre-
dict that settlement rates will depend on whether the offeree understands a given settlement of-
fer as a gain or loss. If an offeree views accepting an offer as a gain, he is likely to prefer settle-
ment-the less risky alternative-to trial; if he sees the offer as a losing proposition, he is likely
to prefer trial-the more risky option.").
. See Rachlinski, 70 S Cal L Rev at 135-38 (cited in note 16) (reporting plaintiff risk aver-
sion and defendant risk seeking in a complicated property dispute involving moderate-to-high
probabilities of plaintiff victory and defendant loss at trial); Babcock, et al, 15 Intl Rev L & Econ
at 293-301 (cited in note 16) (finding that subjects playing the role of plaintiffs' attorneys exhib-
ited risk aversion and subjects playing the role of defense attorneys exhibited risk seeking in hy-
pothetical damages disputes); Korobkin and Guthrie, 93 Mich L Rev at 130-38 (cited in note 16)
(finding evidence of framing in three more factually complicated scenarios in which plaintiff had
at least a moderate probability of prevailing); van Koppen, 14 L & Human Beh at 160-62 (cited
in note 16) (reporting results mostly consistent with the Framing Theory); Hogarth, 19 Annals
Operations Research at 40-41 (cited in note 16) (reporting high settlement rates for plaintiff-
subjects and low settlement rates for defendant-subjects in a hypothetical lawsuit scenario). See
also Korobkin and Guthrie, 76 Tex L Rev at 96-101 (cited in note 16) (comparing litigant and
lawyer risk tendencies in a hypothetical auto accident dispute involving moderate-to-high prob-
abilities of plaintiff victory). Rachlinski also analyzed real-world data from Jury Verdicts Weekly
and found litigation results consistent with his experimental work. See Rachlinski, 70 S Cal L
Rev at 150-60 (cited in note 16). But see Don L. Coursey and Linda R. Stanley, Pretrial Bar-
gaining Behavior within the Shadow of the Law: Theory and Experimental Evidence, 8 Intl Rev L
& Econ 161 (1988) (arguing that legal cost allocation rules influence settlement negotiations and
agreements).
See, for example, Rachlinski, 70 S Cal L Rev at 135-38 (cited in note 16) (reporting plain-
tiff risk aversion and defendant risk seeking in a property dispute in which plaintiff faced either
a 30 percent or 70 percent chance of winning at trial and defendant faced a corresponding 70
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Theory explains how litigants are likely to behave in ordinary litiga-
tion-that is, where they face moderate-to-high probabilities of win-
ning or losing at trial-but it does not explain how litigants are likely
to behave in frivolous or low-probability litigation.
C. The Second Half of the Fourfold Pattern and Frivolous Litigation
For all the attention they have paid to the first half of prospect
theory's fourfold pattern of risk attitudes, legal scholars have largely
ignored the second half of the fourfold pattern despite its relevance to
frivolous litigation behavior. According to the second half of the four-
fold pattern, decisionmakers faced with low-probability gains tend to
make risk-seeking decisions, while decisionmakers faced with low-
probability losses tend to make risk-averse decisions.
Researchers have discovered that individuals exhibit this deci-
sionmaking pattern when responding to simple mathematical prob-
lems"' and when reacting to more complicated decision problems as
well. Donald Wehrung, for instance, recruited 127 executives from
twenty-nine oil and gas firms based in Houston or Calgary to partici-
percent or 30 percent chance of losing at trial); Korobkin and Guthrie, 93 Mich L Rev at 130-35
(cited in note 16) (reporting risk aversion in the face of gains and risk seeking in the face of
losses where both parties implicitly faced a 50 percent chance of prevailing in an auto accident
case and a property dispute); Hogarth, 19 Annals Operations Research at 41 (cited in note 16)
(reporting plaintiff risk aversion and defendant risk seeking in nonambiguous experimental ma-
nipulations involving 50 percent and 80 percent probabilities of prevailing at trial). See also Ko-
robkin and Guthrie, 76 Tex L Rev at 96-101 (cited in note 16) (comparing litigants and lawyers
risk tendencies in an auto accident dispute involving an implicit 50 percent probability of plain-
tiff victory at trial).
See, for example, Pamela K. Lattimore, Joanna R. Baker, and Ann D. White, The influence
of probability on risky choice: A parametric examination, 17 J Econ Beh & Org 377,379 (1992)
(finding that "[olverweighting of 'small' probabilities was common" in subjects' reactions to hy-
pothetical decision problems involving choices about criminal behavior); Michele Cohen, Jean-
Yves Jaffray, and Tanios Said, Experimental Comparison of Individual Behavior under Risk and
under Uncertainty for Gains and for Losses, 39 Organizational Beh & Human Decision Pro-
cesses 1, 10 (1987) (reporting in their study of elicited risk preferences that "on the gain side,
subjects move from risk aversion to risk seeking when [probability] decreases," while "the oppo-
site is true on the loss side"); John C. Hershey, Howard C. Kunreuther, and Paul J.H. Schoe-
maker, Sources of Bias in Assessment Procedures for Utility Functions, 28 Mgmt Sci 936, 944
(1982) (finding "considerable risk-seeking for gains, particularly for small amounts and low
probabilities"); Hershey and Schoemaker, 47 J Risk & Ins at 121-22 (cited in note 63) (finding
some evidence of risk aversion in the face of low-probability losses); Kahneman and Tversky, 47
Econometrica at 281 (cited in note 11) (reporting that 72 percent of subjects preferred a .001
chance at a $5,000 gain over a certain $5 gain, while 83 percent of subjects preferred a certain $5
loss to a .001 chance at a $5,000 loss); Malcolm G. Preston and Philip Baratta, An Experimental
Study of the Auction-Value of an Uncertain Outcome, 61 Am J Psych 183,188-89 (1948) (report-
ing evidence of overweighting of small probabilities in an auction study and concluding that "we
are left with the hypothesis that when p [is less than or equal to] 0.05, players uniformly conceive
the probability as somewhat higher, while with p [greater than or equal to] 0.25 players uni-
formly conceive the probability as somewhat lower").
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pate in his study of risky decisionmaking.n He presented these experi-
enced oil executives with realistic decision problems involving the op-
portunity for 15ig gains (up to $60 million) and the threat of big losses
(up to -$60 million).f He found that 51.3 percent of executives were
more risk seeking when faced with lower-probability gains than when
faced with higher-probability gains (while only 9.7 percent were more
risk averse).n When faced with losses, by contrast, Wehrung found that
51.3 percent of executives exhibited greater risk aversion in the face of
lower-probability losses than in the face of higher-probability losses
(while only 11.5 percent exhibited greater risk seeking).n
Steven J. Kachelmeier and Mohamed Shehata conducted a series
of similar experiments with graduate students at Beijing University.9
Because of the relatively lower salaries paid in China, Kachelmeier
and Shehata could offer subjects substantial monetary awards. In the
highest payoff condition, for instance, they offered subjects an amount
roughly equal to three months worth of income!9 Kachelmeier and
Shehata found "a pattern of strongly risk-seeking preferences for low-
probability gain prospects." While risk seeking was "slightly more
pronounced for lower payoffs," they found that "even in the highest
payoff condition, the cash equivalent for a 5 percent bet (their lowest
probability level) was, on average, three times larger than its expected
value."" In other words, the subjects demanded the certain equivalent
of approximately two weeks pay to give up their 1 in 20 chance at
three months pay!9
The subjects in all of these experiments made decisions consistent
with the second half of prospect theory's fourfold pattern. When faced
Donald A. Wehrung, Risk Taking Over Gains and Losses: A Study of Oil Executives, 19
Annals of Operations Research 115,116,119 (1989).
Id at 120.
Id at 125. The remaining 38.9 percent exhibited the same risk-tendency in both the low-
probability and high-probability decision problems. Id.
Id. The remaining 37.1 percent exhibited the same risk-tendency in both the low-
probability and high-probability decision problems. Id.
Steven J. Kachelmeier and Mohamed Shehata, Examining Risk Preferences Under High
Monetary Incentives: Experimental Evidence from the People's Republic of China, 82 Am Econ
Rev 1120 (1992).
Id at 1120.
Id at 1137.
Tversky and Kahneman, 5 J Risk & Uncertainty at 315 (cited in note 11) (summarizing
Kachehneier and Shehata experiments and results).
To make this concrete, assume that the students in this study earned $500 per month or
$1,500 every three months. In the highest-payoff ($1,500) and lowest-probability (5 percent) de-
cision problem, students on average preferred the 5 percent chance at $1,500 (an expected value
of $75) to certain cash payments up to three times the expected value of the gamble ($225).
Three times the expected value of the gamble is approximately two weeks' pay. In a 31-day
month, the students in this hypothetical earn $500, which means they earn $16.13 per day or
$225.81 every two weeks.
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with low-probability gains, they exhibited risk-seeking tendencies;
when faced with low-probability losses, they tended to prefer the rela-
tively more risk-averse option. Building on this insight, I develop a
positive theory of frivolous litigation in the next part of the Article.
IH. A PSYCHOLOGICAL AccouNT OF FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION
The Framing Theory, which builds on the first half of prospect
theory's fourfold pattern of risk attitudes, describes how litigants are
likely to behave in ordinary litigation." The Frivolous Framing Theory,
which I propose in this part of the Article, builds on the second half of
prospect theory's fourfold pattern of risk attitudes to describe how
litigants are likely to behave in frtivolous litigation.9
I begin below by operationalizing frivolous litigation as low-
probability litigation. Then, I introduce the proposed Frivolous Fram-
ing Theory, which is composed of two propositions. First, the theory
posits that plaintiffs in frivolous litigation are likely to prefer trial-
the risk-seeking option-while defendants are likely to prefer settle-
ment-the risk-averse option. Second, given these psychological incli-
nations, the theory posits that plaintiffs and defendants in frivolous
litigation are likely either to settle cases on terms advantageous to the
plaintiff or to reach bargaining impasse.
A. Operationalizing Frivolous Litigation
Frivolous litigation can be a surprisingly elusive,7 controversial,
and value-laden construct. For most litigants and attorneys in the
See Part H.B.
The Frivolous Framing Theory focuses on the decisionmaking tendencies of the litigants in
frivolous litigation. Although lawyers undoubtedly play a significant role in litigation decision-
making, the litigants retain ultimate authority to make substantive litigation decisions. See, for
example, Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-7 (ABA 1980) (providing that "it is
for the client to decide whether he will accept a settlement offer"); Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 1.2(a) (ABA 1995) ("A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to accept
an offer of settlement of a matter.").
See, for example, Bone, 145 U Pa L Rev at 529 (cited in note 1) ("Most commentators use
the term 'frivolous suit' without defining it, as if the meaning were obvious to all. But the con-
cept is quite slippery."); id at 596 ("Frivolous litigation is a complex phenomenon. It is difficult to
define and almost impossible to observe, and it defies all attempts at simple explanation.");
David B. 'Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 Harv L Rev 799,866 (1992) (noting that
"the definition of frivolousness is notoriously vague"); Sanford Levinson, Frivolous Cases: Do
Lawyers Really Know Anything At All?, 24 Osgoode Hall L J 353,378 (1986) (noting that it is
impossible "to explain (or teach to students) exactly what constitutes the frivolous case as con-
trasted with those that are weak but nonetheless non-frivolous").
The term "frivolous litigation," in other words, is often imbued not only with positive con-
tent, but with normative content as well. See, for example, Bone, 145 U Pa L Rev at 531 (cited in
note 1) (noting that "we label a lawsuit 'frivolous' not simply to say something about its merits,
but to express a normative judgment that suit should not be brought"); Warren E Schwartz and
C. Frederick Beckner III, Toward A Theory of the 'Meritorious Case. Legal Uncertainty as a So-
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trenches of the civil justice system, however, a frivolous case is simply
a case in which the plaintiff has a low probability of prevailing at
trial.! While an occasional plaintiff might file a claim that both liti-
gants recognize has no possibility of success, most litigants will predict
that such claims have at least some chance of prevailing-maybe a 1
in 10 chance or a 1 in 20 chance or a 1 in 100 chance-because of the
uncertainties inherent in the litigation process."O
Litigants, after all, must make ex ante rather than ex post deter-
minations about the likely merits of the plaintiff's case.0' Before and
cial Choice Problem, 6 Geo Mason U L Rev 801 (1998) (noting that "terms such as 'frivolous'
and 'strike' suits are employed with the apparent meaning that it is socially undesirable for cases
with 'too little' chance of success to be brought"); Charles M. Yablon, The Good, the Bad, and the
Frivolous Case:An Essay on Probability and Rule 11, 44 UCLA L Rev 65,66 (1996) (contending
that "lt]he usual, if slightly circular explanation [of frivolous claims], is that frivolous claims are
those that are so lacking in merit they should never have been brought in the first place").
For definitions of frivolous litigation consistent with this characterization, see Yablon, 44
UCLA L Rev at 67 (cited in note 98) (arguing that frivolous cases are "long shots that didn't pan
out, rather than baseless claims that should never have been brought"); Polinsky and Rubinfeld,
82 Georgetown L J at 404 (cited in note 47) (assuming that "however a frivolous suit is defined, a
frivolous plaintiff bringing the same claim as a legitimate plaintiff has a lower probability of pre-
vailing at trial than the legitimate plaintiff"); Bebchuk, 17 J Legal Stud at 437 (cited in note 36)
(defining a frivolous suit as one in which "the chances of winning a trial are small"); P'ng, 14 Bell
J Econ at 548 (cited in note 30) ("It seems reasonable to characterize a frivolous suit as an action
where both sides know that it is very unlikely that a trial outcome will favor the plaintiff"). See
also Black's Law Dictionary 668 (West 6th ed 1990) (defining a frivolous action as a
"[g]roundless lawsuit with little prospect of success; often brought to embarrass or annoy the de-
fendant") (emphasis added).
For other conceptions of frivolous litigation, see, for example, Bone, 145 U Pa L Rev at 530,
533 (cited in note 1) (rejecting "low-probability" as a definition of frivolous litigation and pro-
posing instead that a "suit is frivolous (1) when a plaintiff files knowing facts that establish com-
plete (or virtually complete) absence of merit as an objective matter on the legal theories alleged, or
(2) when a plaintiff files without conducting a reasonable investigation which, if conducted, would
place the suit in prong (1)"); Eric Rasmusen, Predictable and Unpredictable Error in Tort Awards:
The Effect of Plaintiff Self-Selection and Signaling, 15 Intl Rev L & Econ 323,337 (1995) (defin-
ing frivolous suits as negative expected value suits or "suits in which the expected value of the
court award is less than the plaintiffs transaction costs of obtaining the award"); Rosenberg and
Shavell, 5 Intl Rev L & Econ at 3 (cited in note 30) (defining a frivolous lawsuit as one "in which
the plaintiff is able to obtain a positive settlement from the defendant even though the defen-
dant knows the plaintiff's case is sufficiently weak that he would be unwilling or unlikely actually
to pursue his case to trial").
" Consider Yablon, 44 UCLA L Rev 65 (cited in note 98) (contending that all frivolous
cases are in fact long-shot cases due to a myriad of uncertainties associated with litigation).
- Litigants typically assess the merits or likelihood of success of their claims prior to, and
perhaps during, the litigation process, while judges assess the merits of a suit after it has been
adjudicated. See, for example, id at 76-81.
A judge deciding a motion for sanctions is looking at a case that has already been adjudi-
cated and found to be without merit. Although the law requires her to evaluate the case as
of the time it was initially brought, the judge, in fact, knows a lot more than the lawyer did
at that time. She knows the facts and legal rules that were actually presented to the court,
and which ones turned out to be dispositive .... This hindsight can affect a judge's view ....
Id at 78. Research on the well documented "hindsight bias" demonstrates that decisionmakers
do, in fact, routinely overestimate the predictability of past events. See Baruch Fischhoff, Hind-
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during trial, litigants face uncertainties about the facts, the governing
law, the application of law to fact, the adversary's lawyering skills and
presentation of the case, the predilections of the judge with respect to
procedural and substantive law, and the biases of the jurors, among
others.' Because of any or all of these uncertainties, "there is inevita-
bly some probability, however low, that the plaintiff will recover dam-
ages." 1°3 Given that it "seems reasonable to characterize a frivolous
suit as an action where both sides know that it is very unlikely that a
trial outcome will favor the plaintiff," I the Frivolous Framing Theory
operationalizes frivolous litigation as low-probability litigation.1 'O
B. Proposition #1: Contrasting Risk Attitudes
The Frivolous Framing Theory posits that plaintiffs in frivolous or
low-probability litigation, in contrast to plaintiffs in ordinary litigation,
are likely to be risk seeking, while defendants in frivolous litigation, in
contrast to defendants in ordinary litigation, are likely to be risk
averse. Plaintiffs in frivolous suits, in other words, are likely to view
litigation options as low-probability gains, so they are inclined to pre-
fer trial to an actuarially fair settlement, while defendants in frivolous
suits are likely to view litigation options as low-probability losses, so
they are inclined to prefer an actuarially fair settlement to trial.'O, Ta-
sight [Does Not Equal] Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncer-
tainty, 1 J Exp Psych 288 (1975).
" See Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Howard E Chang, An Analysis of Fee Shifting Based on the
Margin of Victory: On Frivolous SuitS Meritorious Suit; and the Role of Rule 11,25 J Legal Stud
371,373 (1996) ("One source of uncertainty is that the court might lack information available to
the plaintiff or can err in its judgment given the information that it can observe. Furthermore, the
plaintiff might lack information that a trial would later reveal to the court. As a result, the plain-
tiff might attach some probability to winning even if it views its case as weak, and it might attach
some probability to losing even if it views its case as strong."); Yablon, 44 UCLA L Rev at 93 n
71 (cited in note 98) (identifying "vagueness or indeterminacy of legal doctrine, imperfect
knowledge of the facts, uncertainty as to the impact evidence will have on the decisionmaker,
and uncertainty as to the identity of the decisionmaker" as sources of uncertainty in low-
probability cases); id at 98 (identifying "the particular judge's view of 12(b)(6), or the documents
in defendant's files, or how raffled a client will get when deposed" as sources of litigation uncer-
tainty).
" Samuel R. Gross and Kent D. Syverud, Getting To No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations
and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 Mich L Rev 319,342 (1991).
P'ng, 14 Bell J Econ at 548 (cited in note 30).
""Low-probability litigation" is obviously an over-inclusive definition, for it would include
civil rights test cases, a category of case that I would not label "frivolous" in ordinary parlance.
See, for example, Bone, 145 U Pa L Rev at 531 (cited in note 1) (identifying civil rights test cases
as low-probability cases); Polinsky and Rubinfeld, 82 Georgetown L J at 405 n 20 (cited in note
47) ("An example of a low-probability legitimate suit might be a suit filed in good faith that at-
tempts to reverse a long-standing law."). This Article focuses on low-probability cases in which
money damages are the centerpiece of the dispute and excludes those cases in which the parties
are seeking to vindicate important principles or to modify current law.
- The Frivolous Framing Theory, like the Framing Theory, assumes that plaintiffs generally
view litigation options as gains, and defendants generally view litigation options as losses, "be-
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ble 3 presents litigants' predicted risk attitudes in frivolous or low-
probability litigation.
TABLE 3
RISK ATITUDES IN FRIVOLOUS OR
LoW-PROBABILITY LrIGATION
Decision Frame Risk Attitude Explanation
Plaintiff low probability risk seeking overweighting of
gains probabilities
Defendant low probability risk averse overweighting of
I losses I probabilities
To explore this proposition, I administered two simple litigation
problems to first-year students at the University of Missouri School of
Law. Consider first the simple litigation problem that I gave to 40 stu-
dents, approximately half of whom played the role of plaintiff and half
the role of defendant. Subjects playing the role of plaintiff in this sim-
ple litigation problem received the following information:
Imagine that you are a plaintiff who has sued defendant for
$5,000. Assuming no attorneys' fees or costs, ' ' which would you
prefer:
" A 1% chance of winning $5,000 at trial
* A certain $50 settlement payment from defendant
The defendant-subjects received the corresponding information:
Imagine that you are a defendant whom plaintiff has sued for
$5,000. Assuming no attorneys' fees or costs, which would you
prefer:
* A 1% chance of losing $5,000 at trial
• A certain $50 settlement payment to plaintiff
In this simple frivolous litigation problem, the plaintiff-subjects
faced a choice between two options with identical expected values-a
certain $50 settlement or an expected trial verdict valued at $50 (1% x
cause people internalize losses and gains relatively quickly." Rachlinski, 70 S Cal L Rev at 129 n
65 (cited in note 16) ("Since the events that led to the litigation sometimes predate the settle-
ment talks by years, parties have probably endowed the gains or losses by the time litigation oc-
curs.").
- For a defense of this convention see Korobkin and Guthrie, 93 Mich L Rev at 124-25
(cited in note 16) (explaining the decision to exclude attorneys' fees from between-group deci-
sion problems like the one reported here). See also Rachlinski, 70 S Cal L Rev at 136 (cited in
note 16) (noting that he did not mention attorney's fees in his key simulation).
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$5,000 + 99% x $0 = $50).' Like the plaintiff-subjects, the defendant-
subjects faced a choice between two options with identical expected
values-a certain $50 settlement payment to plaintiff or an expected
trial verdict valued at -$50 (1% x -$5,000 + 99% x $0 = -$50).
Consistent with the Frivolous Framing Theory, I found that 62
percent of the subjects (13 of 21) evaluating the problem from the
plaintiff's perspective selected trial, the risk-seeking option. In stark
contrast, 84 percent of the subjects (16 of 19) evaluating the problem
from the defendant's perspective preferred settlement, the risk-averse
option. Despite the relatively small sample size, the difference be-
tween plaintiff-subjects and defendant-subjects is highly statistically
significant."° In this simple frivolous litigation problem, plaintiffs
strongly preferred trial to an actuarially fair settlement offer, while de-
fendants overwhelmingly preferred to pay that settlement offer de-
spite the very low likelihood they would lose at trial.
I gave another group of 74 students a slightly more complicated
and factually rich frivolous litigation vignette called "The Contract."'
In The Contract, subjects playing either the role of plaintiff or the role
of defendant are asked to imagine themselves in a breach of contract
suit. Both plaintiff-subjects and defendant-subjects learn that plaintiff
believes defendant has breached and that the breach has cost plaintiff
$6,000. As a result, plaintiff has sued defendant in municipal court for
$6,000. Both plaintiff and defendant retain attorneys representing
- The decisionmaking problem explicitly states that plaintiff has "a 1% chance of winning
$5,000 at trial" but only implies that plaintiff has a corresponding 99 percent chance of winning
$0. That is, the problem does not explicitly define the trial option as "a 1% chance of winning
$5,000 at trial and a 99% chance of winning $0." In the unlikely event that a subject did not infer
from the problem a corresponding 99 percent chance of winning $0-for example, she inferred
that she had a 50 percent chance of recovering $2,500 and a 49 percent chance of recovering
$0-that subject might have chosen the trial option not because of a risk-seeking preference but
rather because its expected value exceeded the value of settlement. In the example given, for in-
stance, the expected value would be $1,300 (1% x $5,000 + 50% x $2,500 + 49% x $0 = $1,300).
While I acknowledge this possibility, it seems unlikely to me that subjects would draw this infer-
ence from the problem statement. Moreover, this is a fairly conventional means of identifying
the uncertain option in a decision problem of this type. See, for example, Rachlinski, 70 S Cal L
Rev at 128 (cited in note 16) (identifying the uncertain trial option faced by plaintiff as "a 50%
chance of winning a $400,000 award" rather than "a 50% chance of winning a $400,000 award
and a 50% chance of winning $0").
11 p = .004. To test for statistical significance, I performed a two-tailed, Fisher's exact test,
which is "[a] procedure for determining the exact probability of obtaining particular frequencies
in a 2 x 2 table," rather than an approximation. Barry Cohen, Explaining Psychological Statistics
715 (Brooks/Cole 1996). See also B.S. Everitt, The Analysis of Contingency Tables 14-19 (Chap-
man & Hall 2d ed 1992) (explaining Fisher's exact test). Where the sample size is small and/or
any of the expected cell frequencies is small, as is the case here, the Fisher's exact test, rather
than the chi-squared test, should be used. See Everitt, Analysis of Contingency Tables at 14; Mi-
chael 0. Finkelstein and Bruce Levin, Statistics for Lawyers 164 (Springer-Verlag 1990).
"' The Contract (unpublished survey performed by author) (on file with author).
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them free of charge,"' and both the plaintiff-subjects and the defen-
dant-subjects learn that their respective attorneys have studied the
facts of the case, the governing law, and the judge who will adjudicate
the case. Based on this review, the attorneys have informed their re-
spective clients that the judge will award plaintiff either $6,000 or $0
"depending upon how the judge interprets the contract."2 The attor-
ney for each party then predicts that there is a 5 percent chance that
the judge will award plaintiff $6,000. Finally, the plaintiff-subjects
learn that the defendant has offered to settle the case for $300, and the
defendant-subjects learn that the plaintiff has agreed to settle the case
if the defendant will pay $300. The subjects are then asked to indicate
whether they will settle the case.
In this slightly richer litigation vignette, the plaintiff-subjects
faced a choice between two options with identical expected values-a
certain $300 settlement or an expected trial verdict valued at $300
(5% x $6,000 + 95% x $0 = $300). Like the plaintiff-subjects, the de-
fendant-subjects also faced a choice between two options with identi-
cal expected values -a certain $300 settlement payment to plaintiff or
an expected trial verdict valued at -$300 (5% x -$6,000 + 95% x $0 =
-$300).
Consistent with the Frivolous Framing Theory, I again found that
a majority of plaintiffs (20 of 38) expressed a preference for trial, the
risk-seeking option, and more than two-thirds of defendants (25 of 36)
expressed a preference for settlement, the risk-averse option. The dif-
ference between plaintiff-subjects and defendant-subjects is margin-
ally statistically significant,' providing additional support for this ac-
count of frivolous litigation.
See note 107.
". The Contract (cited in note 110).
lu p = .06 (two-tailed, Fisher's exact test). For the sake of consistency, I report statistical sig-
nificance according to the Fisher's exact test. Compare with note 109. Because the sample size
and expected cell frequencies are sufficiently large, I could also have performed a chi-squared
test, which is "[a] commonly used approximation to Fisher's exact test in large samples." Finkel-
stein and Levin, Statistics for Lawyers at 159 (cited in note 109). Per the chi-squared test, the re-
sults are: X2(1) = 2.85,p < .10.
1" The stakes in the two vignettes I report above are admittedly modest, but the stakes in
many real-world cases are also quite modest. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingent-Fee Lawyers
and Their Clients: Settlement ExpectationS Settlement Realities and Issues of Control in the Law-
yer-Client Relationship, 23 L & Soc Inquiry 795,806-12 (1998) (describing cases involving similar
stakes); Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingency fee lawyers as gatekeepers in the civil justice system, 81
Judicature 22, 27 (1997) (reporting that 43 percent of the Wisconsin lawyers in his contingency
fee study indicated that they require a median minimum damage figure of $5,000 in automobile
accident cases before they will agree to take them); Donald R. Songer, Tort Reform in South
Carolina: The Effect of Empirical Research on Elite Perceptions Concerning Jury Verdicts, 39 SC
L Rev 585, 592-93 (1988) (reporting that the median jury verdict for plaintiffs in South Carolina
courts during 1985 was $5,113 overall, $5,050 in all tort cases, and $3,156 in products liability
cases).
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While admittedly only suggestive, 5 this work, coupled with ex-
perimental work outside the litigation context, 6 shows that plaintiffs
and defendants are likely to exhibit fairly predictable risk patterns in
frivolous litigation. Plaintiffs are likely to be psychologically inclined
toward risk-seeking behavior, while defendants are likely to be psy-
chologically inclined toward risk-averse behavior."
7
C. Proposition #2: Advantage Plaintiff
The Frivolous Framing Theory's first proposition-that plaintiffs
in frivolous litigation are relatively more risk seeking than defen-
dants-leads directly to its second proposition: Because plaintiffs in
frivolous suits have a greater tolerance for risk than the defendants
they have sued, the plaintiffs have "psychological leverage" in settle-
ment negotiations, even though they face a very low probability of
prevailing at trial. Whether consciously aware of this or not, plaintiffs
are likely to "use" this psychological leverage to obtain favorable set-
tlements or to "misuse" it to force a case to bargaining impasse.
1. Plaintiff-friendly settlements.
"Power," according to negotiation scholars Samuel Bacharach
and Edward Lawler, "[i]s the [e]ssence of [b]argaining.""8 While liti-
gants may derive bargaining power from a number of sources-in-
cluding the merits of their cases,", the financial resources they pos-
sess,'" and the availability of attractive alternatives to bargaining' 2'-
" Experimental work like that reported above may lack "external validity," which "is a
measure of how certain we are that a relationship observed in a controlled experiment will also
be valid outside of the conditions of that experiment." Robert Thomas Maleske, Foundations for
Gathering and Interpreting Behavioral Data: An Introduction to Statistics 150 (Brooks/Cole
1995). See also Korobkin and Guthrie, 93 Mich L Rev at 126-28 (cited in note 16) (addressing
external validity in a settlement study). Nevertheless, this experimental approach is the most re-
liable means of establishing the impact of a particular variable on individual behavior.
See, for example, Part II.C.
In their study of civil litigation in California, Samuel Gross and Kent Syverud found that
defendants refused to make any settlement offers at all in 26.3 percent of cases sampled, sug-
gesting defendant risk seeking rather than defendant risk aversion. See Gross and Syverud, 90
Mich L Rev at 343 (cited in note 103). At first glance, this finding might appear to contradict the
Frivolous Framing Theory's prediction regarding defendant risk aversion in frivolous litigation.
However, there is no evidence to suggest that these "zero offer cases" were frivolous or low-
probability cases. Indeed, the fact that plaintiffs prevailed at trial in 40 percent of the cases sug-
gests (though it certainly does not prove) that they were not frivolous or low-probability cases. Id
at 346.
Samuel B. Bacharach and Edward J. Lawler, Bargaining: Power, Tactics and Outcomes 43
(Jossey-Bass 1981).
"' See Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L J 950,968 (1979) (noting that "the outcome that the law will impose if
no agreement is reached gives each [party] certain bargaining chips").
See Kritzer, Let's Make a Deal at 73 (cited in note 2) (identifying "the ability to impose
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one of the most potent sources of power a litigant can possess is a
greater tolerance for risk than his adversary. "If there is a disparity in
risk preference," Herbert Kritzer explains, "the player with the lower
aversion to risk can use that as an advantage over the other player,
and thus can be said to have a degree of power.' ' 2
Plaintiffs in frivolous litigation are likely to be more risk seeking
than the defendants they have sued, so plaintiffs in frivolous litigation
are likely to have more power in bargaining. Plaintiffs, in short, find
trial more attractive, so they will demand more than the expected
value of their claim to settle. Defendants, who find trial less attractive,
are also likely to offer more than the expected value of the claim to
settle. Assuming that defendant's inflated offer exceeds the plaintiff's
inflated demand, the parties to a frivolous suit are likely to settle for
an amount greater than the expected value of the claim, thereby bene-
fiting the plaintiff
Recall, for example, the vignette described above in which plain-
tiff sued defendant for breach of contract.m There, the attorneys pre-
dicted to their respective clients that the plaintiff has a 5 percent
chance of winning $6,000 at trial. Suppose that the risk-seeking plain-
tiff is willing to settle for a minimum of $500 and that the risk-averse
defendant is willing to pay up to $1,000 to settle. Because defendant's
maximum offer ($1000) exceeds plaintiff's minimum demand ($500),
plaintiff and defendant are likely to settle the case for some amount
between $500 and $1,000, approximately two-to-three times the ex-
pected value of plaintiff's claim (5% x $6,000 + 95% x $0 = $300 ex-
pected value to plaintiff). The plaintiff, in other words, is likely to ob-
tain an advantageous settlement due to his greater tolerance for risk.
In short, "[i]n any negotiated outcome, a risk preferer will have
an advantage over the party who is risk-averse."' This means that
costs on the other party through legal procedures that are a part of litigation" and "the parties'
capacities for absorbing costs that can be imposed" as two of the "key elements of power" in liti-
gation bargaining).
M See Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement
Without Giving In 102 (Houghton Mifflin 2d ed 1991) (claiming that "the relative negotiating
power of two parties depends primarily upon how attractive to each is the option of not reaching
agreement"). In a separate article, Roger Fisher identified five additional categories of power in
negotiation: (1) skill and knowledge, (2) a good relationship, (3) an elegant solution, (4) legiti-
macy, and (5) commitment. See Roger Fisher, Negotiating Power: Getting and Using Influence, 27
Am Beh Sci 149, 153 (1983). See also G. Richard Shell, Bargaining for Advantage: Negotiation
Strategies for Reasonable People 101-05 (Viking 1999) (identifying positive, negative, and norma-
tive "leverage" or power in negotiation); Charles B. Craver, Effective Legal Negotiation and Set-
tlement 124-44 (Michie 2d ed 1993) (identifying thirteen "common power bargaining tech-
niques").1. Kritzer, Let's Make a Deal at 76 (cited in note 2).
See text accompanying notes 110-114.
Mnookin and Kornhauser, 88 Yale L J at 977 (cited in note 119). See also Kritzer, Let's
Make a Deal at 75 (cited in note 2) ("[I]f one party is risk averse and the other is risk neutral, the
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plaintiffs in frivolous or low-probability litigation, in contrast to plain-
tiffs in ordinary litigation, should consistently enjoy a psychological
edge when bargaining with defendants.
2. Bargaining breakdown.
Plaintiffs' greater tolerance for risk in frivolous litigation may en-
able them to recover advantageous settlements, but plaintiffs' risk
seeking may also undermine settlement efforts if it exceeds defen-
dants' aversion to risk. If, in other words, a risk-seeking plaintiff's in-
flated minimum demand exceeds a risk-averse defendant's inflated
maximum offer, the parties will reach bargaining impasse. Suppose
that the plaintiff in The Contract vignette described above is more risk
seeking than we imagined before, demanding $1,500 to settle the
$6,000 claim, while the defendant is equally risk averse, offering as
much as $1,000 to settle the claim. Under these hypothetical facts,
plaintiffs minimum demand ($1,500) will exceed defendant's maxi-
mum offer ($1,000) by $500, so the parties are unlikely to settle the
suit.1
Cynthia Fobian and Jay J.J. Christensen-Szalanski found evidence
of this phenomenon in an elaborate study designed to assess the im-
pact of ambiguity on settlement."" Fobian and Christensen-Szalanski
randomly assigned subjects to play the role of a plaintiff-patient or de-
fendant-doctor in eight scenarios based on actual medical malpractice
cases.I Subjects received a one-page summary of each case, including
details about the injury the plaintiff suffered, the plaintiff's version of
the facts, and the defendant's version of the facts'28 After reading this
information, the subjects received a prediction from their lawyer
about "the amount of money that would be awarded if the plaintiff
won the case in a court trial, and the probability of the plaintiff win-
ning the case. ''t In the experimental conditions most relevant to this
Article, the subjects learned that their lawyer has "extreme confi-
dence" in his prediction that plaintiff has a low probability (10 per-
cent) of prevailing at trial.
risk-neutral party should be able to exploit that difference to its own advantage.").
Compare Max H. Bazerman, Negotiator Judgment: A Critical Look at the Rationality As-
sumption, 27 Am Beh Sci 211, 212-15 (1983) (reporting studies showing generally that risk-
averse parties were more concessionary and more likely to reach deals than risk-seeking par-
ties).
1% See Cynthia S. Fobian and Jay JJ. Christensen-Szalanski, Ambiguity and Liability Negotia-
tions: The Effects of the Negotiators' Role and the Sensitivity Zone, 54 Organizational Beh &
Human Decision Processes 277,280 (1993).
Id at 284.
Id. For a sample case, see id at Appendix 296-97 (providing copy of vignette based on
Gillette v Tucker, 67 Ohio St 106,65 NE 865 (1902)).
4 Id at 284.
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Armed with the facts of the dispute and the lawyer's prediction
regarding the likely outcome, the plaintiff-subjects were asked to indi-
cate the minimum amount of money they would accept to settle, and
the defendant-subjects were asked to indicate the maximum amount
of money they would pay to settle, in both low-damage and high-
damage cases.'
In the low-probability, low-damage cases, the plaintiff-subjects
and defendant-subjects learned that the plaintiff has a 10 percent
chance of winning $100,000 at trial. Thus, the plaintiffs faced an ex-
pected trial verdict of $10,000 (10% x $100,000 + 90% x $0 = $10,000),
while the defendants faced an expected trial verdict of -$10,000 (10%
x -$100,000 + 90% x $0 = -$10,000). Given these expectations, a risk-
neutral plaintiff would accept $10,000 to settle, and a risk-neutral de-
fendant would agree to pay $10,000 to settle.
In fact, however, the plaintiff-subjects demanded, on average,
$53,000.2' Plaintiffs in this low-probability litigation, in other words,
exhibited risk-seeking behavior, demanding more than five times the
expected value of trial to settle the case. Defendant-subjects, by con-
trast, expressed a willingness to pay, on average, $16,000.'3 Defendants,
in other words, exhibited risk-averse behavior, offering 60 percent
more than the expected value of trial to settle the case, even though
they were likely to win at trial nine times out of ten. Assuming that
plaintiffs continue to demand $53,000 to settle, and defendants refuse
to offer more than $16,000 to settle, plaintiffs and defendants are un-
likely to reach agreement because of the $37,000 that separates them.
The researchers obtained similar results in frivolous or low-
probability cases involving high damages. In the low-probability, high-
damages cases, plaintiff-subjects and defendant-subjects learn that the
plaintiff has a 10 percent chance of winning $1 million at trial. The
plaintiffs in this condition thus faced an expected trial verdict of
' Id. Fobian and Christensen-Szalanski, in other words, asked subjects to provide a figure
slightly higher than their "certainty equivalent." A certainty equivalent is "the amount of money
for which a person is indifferent between receiving that amount of money for certain or playing
the gamble." Gonzalez and Wu, 38 Cognitive Psych at 133 (cited in note 67). For a general dis-
cussion, see John C. Hershey and Pai J.H. Schoemaker, Probability versus Certainty Equivalence
Methods in Utility Measurement:Are They Equivalent?, 31 Mgmt Sci 1213 (1985).
Fobian and Christensen-Szalanski, 54 Organizational Beh & Human Decision Processes at
286 (cited in note 126).
Id at 285. When the researchers introduced ambiguity into these low-probability, low-
damages cases by indicating that the attorney for each party had "little confidence," rather than
"extreme confidence," in his prediction that plaintiff had a 10 percent chance of winning
$100,000 at trial, the plaintiff-subjects' settlement demands remained unchanged. Id at 286. The
insertion of ambiguity into the situation did have an effect on defendant-subjects, however. De-
fendant-subjects exhibited twice as much risk aversion when the predicted outcome appeared
ambiguous, indicating a willingness to pay as much as $32,000, on average, to settle the case. Id at
285.
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$100,000 (10% x $1,000,000 + 90% x $0 = $100,000), while the defen-
dants faced an expected trial verdict of -$100,000 (10% x -$1,000,000
+ 90% x $0 = -$100,000). Given this expectation, a risk-neutral plain-
tiff would agree to settle for $100,000, and a risk-neutral defendant
would agree to pay $100,000 to settle.
In fact, however, plaintiffs demanded, on average, $3 60 ,000.L In
this low-probability litigation, in other words, plaintiffs again exhibited
risk-seeking behavior, demanding nearly four times the expected
value of trial to settle the case. Defendants, by contrast, exhibited
slight risk aversion, expressing a willingness to pay $1,000 more than
the expected value of the claim, $101,000.'M Assuming plaintiffs con-
tinue to demand $360,000 to settle, and defendants refuse to offer
more than $101,000 to settle, plaintiffs and defendants are unlikely to
reach agreement because of the $259,000 that separates them.35
Bargaining impasse appears likely to result in these low-
probability cases because plaintiffs' risk-seeking demands exceeded
defendants' risk-averse offers. Indeed, plaintiffs exhibited extreme
risk-seeking behavior in these cases, demanding four-to-five times
their expected value to settle. Explaining plaintiffs' apparent taste for
risk in frivolous or low-probability litigation is the subject of the next
part of the Article.
IV. EXPLORING WHY PLAINTIFFS SEEK RISK IN
FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION
The Frivolous Framing Theory's observation that plaintiffs in
frivolous litigation are risk seeking is surprising because scholars gen-
erally assume that litigants are risk averse.3 Indeed, Samuel Gross
Id at 286.
Id at 285. When the researchers introduced ambiguity into these low-probability, high-
damages cases by indicating that the attorney for each party had "little confidence," rather than
"extreme confidence," in his prediction that plaintiff had a 10 percent chance of winning $1 mil-
lion at trial, the plaintiff-subjects' settlement demands remained virtually unchanged, as the
amount plaintiffs were willing to accept to settle dropped from $360,000 to $352,000. Id at 286.
The insertion of ambiguity into the situation again had a much more pronounced affect on de-
fendant-subjects. The defendant-subjects exhibited more than twice as much risk aversion when
the predicted outcome appeared ambiguous, offering to pay as much as $220,000, on average, to
settle the case. Id at 285.
While subjects responding to Fobian and Christensen-Szalanski's low-probability cases
behaved consistent with the Frivolous Framing Theory, subjects responding to high-probability
cases administered by the researchers behaved consistently with the Framing Theory. See id at
286. 28 See note 25. Scholars tend to assume that risk-seeking behavior is unstable and senseless.
See, for example, Rachlinski,70 S Cal L Rev at 122 (cited in note 16) ("Why would anyone make
a risk-seeking decision in litigation? Absent a penchant for risk (which could be satisfied easily
and at less cost by taking a trip to Las Vegas), risk-seeking choices make no sense."); McCaffery,
1994 Wis L Rev at 73 (cited in note 63) (noting that risk-seeking behavior "is an inherently un-
stable state that we would not desire to flourish"). But see Donald P. Judges, Of Rocks and Hard
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and Kent Syverud hypothesize that plaintiffs in low-probability litiga-
tion are particularly prone to risk aversion, contending that "plaintiffs
will [generally] accept offers that are well below their estimates of the
expected value of the judgment at trial" and that "[t]hey are most
likely to do so in cases with low probabilities of success at trial."m
According to the Frivolous Framing Theory, plaintiffs make risk-
seeking decisions because the decision frame in frivolous litigation in-
duces them to overweight their low-probability chances of prevailing
at trial. '3 But why do plaintiffs overweight low-probability prospects?
Unfortunately, the "conditions under which low probabilities are
overweighted ... are not spelled out in [prospect] theory. 1 39 Never-
theless, I attempt to identify below four potential explanations of
plaintiffs' risk-seeking behavior in frivolous litigation: a psychophysi-
cal explanation, a motivational or emotional explanation, a cognitive
explanation, and a "rational" explanation.
A. Explanation #1: Psychophysical
Psychophysical explanations posit that "the same psychological
properties that underlie the perception of physical stimuli also under-
lie the evaluation of monetary outcomes."' The particular psycho-
physical phenomenon that accounts for the overweighting of low-
probability risks, according to Kahneman and Tversky, is a "category-
boundary effect" known as the principle of "diminishing sensitivity."
The principle of diminishing sensitivity refers to the phenomenon
that changes at the endpoints of a scale are more meaningful than
changes closer to the middle.14 1 Consider an example from the physical
Places: The Value of Risk Choice, 42 Emory L J 1, 3-5 (1993) (arguing that tort law should pro-
tect individuals' risk-seeking behavior as an important component of individual autonomy).
Gross and Syverud, 90 Mich L Rev at 352 (cited in note 103).
See notes 62-63 and 71-74 and accompanying text.
Colin F. Camerer and Howard Kunreuther, Decision Processes for Low Probability Events:
Policy Implications, 8 J Pol Analysis & Mgmt 565, 572 (1989). See also Gonzalez and Wu, 38
Cognitive Psych at 136 (cited in note 67) (noting that there has been little progress in establish-
ing a psychological foundation for the weighting function).
- Richard P. Larrick, Motivational Factors in Decision Theories: The Role of Self-Protection,
113 Psych Bull 440,441-42 (1993) (noting that prospect theory, as well as cardinal utility theory,
proposes "that a single, hardwired mechanism guides the decisions of all people"). See also Gon-
zalez and Wu, 38 Cognitive Psych at 129 (cited in note 67) ("The perception of probability has a
psychophysics all its own.").
See, for example, Tversky and Kahneman, 5 J Risk & Uncertainty at 303 (cited in note 11)
("Diminishing sensitivity eitails that the impact of a given change in probability diminishes with
its distance from the boundary. For example, an increase of .1 in the probability of winning a
given prize has more impact when it changes the probability of winning from .9 to 1.0 or from 0
to .1, than when it changes the probability of winning from .3 to .4 or from .6 to .7."); Kahneman
and Tversky, 39 Am Psych at 344 (cited in note 11) (explaining that a category-boundary effect
arises in that "[a] change from impossibility to possibility or from possibility to certainty has a
bigger impact than a comparable change in the middle of the scale"); Kahneman and Tversky,
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world. Imagine that you are seated in a room with an overhead light
that can be set anywhere from zero (off) to six (brightest). Due to di-
minishing sensitivity, changes in settings at the endpoints, for example,
zero-to-one, are likely to appear more prominent or noticeable than
changes in settings located at the middle, such as three-to-four. "2 In
other words, a slight increase in lighting will seem more pronounced
when you are sitting in the dark than when you are sitting in a moder-
ately lit room.
Similarly, in assessing probabilistic outcomes, changes at the ends
of the scale are likely to loom larger than changes in the middle. Sup-
pose, for example, that you have a lottery ticket with an uncertain
prospect of winning. "Intuition suggests that the value of the ticket is
not a linear function of the probability of winning" but rather that "an
increase from 0% to 5% appears to have a larger effect than an in-
crease from 30% to 35%, ' ' even though each increase is equal to five
percentage points. Similarly, "[i]f men have a 2% chance of contract-
ing a particular disease and women have a 1% chance, we perceive the
risk for men as twice the risk for women. However, the same differ-
ence of 1% appears less dramatic when the chance of contracting the
disease is near the middle of the probability scale, e.g., a 33% chance
for men and a 32% chance for women may be perceived as a trivial
sex difference."I In short, "[a] change from impossibility to possibility
or from possibility to certainty has a bigger impact than a comparable
change in the middle of the scale."14 Because of diminishing sensitiv-
ity, decisionmakers are likely to overweight low probabilities and un-
derweight moderate-to-high probabilities.
While this psychophysical explanation is compelling, it is lacking
in two regards. First, the psychophysical explanation accounts for why
decisionmakers might overweight low probabilities relative to moder-
246 Scientific Am at 164 (cited in note 11) (explaining that "the difference between certainty and
possibility and the difference between possibility and impossibility loom larger than comparable
differences in the intermediate range of probability"). See also Gonzalez and Wu, 38 Cognitive
Psych at 136 (cited in note 67) ("Under the principle of diminishing sensitivity, increments near
the end points of the probability scale loom larger than increments near the middle of the
scale.").
1. For another example, see Lopes, 20 Advances Experimental Soc Psych at 260-61 (cited in
note 10) ("This is the same sort of thing that happens in the 'categorical perception' of human
speech. Sounds that actually change in equal acoustic increments from an ideal 'ba' to an ideal
'da' are perceived to shift abruptly from sounding like clear ba's to sounding like clear da's.")
(internal citation omitted).
" Kahneman and Tversky, 39 Am Psych at 344 (cited in note 11). See also Kahneman and
Tversky, 246 Scientific Am at 164 (cited in note 11) ("[T]he difference between certainty and
possibility and the difference between possibility and impossibility loom larger than comparable
differences in the intermediate range of probability.").
Gonzalez and Wu, 38 Cognitive Psych at 129-30 (cited in note 67).
Kahneman and Tversky, 39 Am Psych at 344 (cited in note 11).
Id at 345.
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ate-to-high probabilities-it explains, in other words, why changes at
the low end of the scale are more noticeable than changes at the mid-
dle of the scale-but it does not explain why it leads to overweighting,
rather than merely less underweighting, at the low end of the scale."'
Second, as psychologist Richard Larrick explains, the psychophysical
explanation is limited in that it "does not consider the possibility that
people might have affective responses to risk itself.' 'la Indeed, feelings
and motivations may provide another explanation for plaintiffs'
treatment of risk in frivolous litigation.
B. Explanation #2: Motivational
Motivational explanations draw not only upon individuals' per-
ceptions of probabilities, but also upon individuals' emotions, to ex-
plain risky decisionmaking. "The motivational approach assumes," in
other words, "that people are not just concerned with the objective
consequences of decisions but also with the affective consequences of
decisions and the motivational states that ameliorate or intensify
them. 149 While full consideration of all the motivational forces that
might explain a plaintiffs risk-seeking behavior in frivolous litigation
is beyond the scope of this paper, three motivational forces seem par-
ticularly likely to account for that behavior: hope, elation, and rejoic-
ing.
1. Hope > Fear.
The first emotion that might help explain plaintiffs' tendencies to
overweight their low-probability prospects of winning at trial is hope.
When the plaintiff in a frivolous or low-probability suit faces a choice
between a $500 settlement offer and a long-shot chance at recovering
$20,000 at trial, she makes a decision not only about the dollar
amounts involved, but also about whether she is going to hold onto
" Richard Gonzalez and George Wu explain that "the concept of diminishing sensitivity [or
the psychophysical explanation] provides an incomplete account of the weighting function. Even
though the concept can explain the curvature of the weighting function, it cannot account for the
level of absolute weights." Gonzalez and Wu, 38 Cognitive Psych at 138 (cited in note 67). In
other words, the psychophysical account provided by Tversky and Kahneman "is silent about
underweighting or overweighting relative to the objective probability." Id (internal parenthetical
omitted). Gonzalez and Wu attempt to enrich the psychophysical explanation by proposing that
overweighting of low probabilities is a product not only of diminishing sensitivity, but also "at-
tractiveness," which they define as the idea that "one person finds betting on the chance domain
more attractive than the second person." Gonzalez and Wu, 38 Cognitive Psych at 138.
Larrick, 113 Psych Bull at 442 (cited in note 140).
'Id at 445. See also id at 443-44 (noting that the motivational explanation assumes "people
respond to the emotional consequences of making a decision that come from self-awareness and
a sense of agency: feelings of success and failure, elation and disappointment, efficacy and impo-
tence, rejoicing and regret").
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hope (i.e., the prospect of recovering the full $20,000 at trial) or yield
to fear (i.e., the prospect of recovering nothing at trial).'" In frivolous
litigation, in contrast to ordinary litigation, the settlement amount is
generally so small relative to what may be available at trial that plain-
tiffs may be more likely to hold on to hope than to give in to fear
when deciding whether to settle or try their cases.
2. Elation > Disappointment.
The second emotion that might help explain plaintiffs' risk-
seeking behavior in frivolous litigation is elation. According to David
Bell's "disappointment theory," decisionmakers seek to maximize ela-
tion and minimize disappointment when making decisions.151 Elation,
for Bell, refers to "the euphoria associated with an outcome that ex-
ceeds expectations."' 5 Disappointment, by contrast, "is a psychological
reaction to an outcome that does not match up to expectations. ''53
Disappointment theory posits that an individual is likely to feel
more elation upon winning a gamble she did not expect to win than
upon winning a gamble she expected to win.'5' A decisionmaker, in
other words, will feel more elated after winning a $10,000 prize if she
had a 10 percent chance of winning than if she had a 90 percent
chance of winning. Conversely, disappointment theory posits that an
individual's disappointment upon losing a gamble is likely to be
greater the higher the probability of winning."' A decisionmaker, in
other words, will feel more disappointment after losing a gamble that
she had a 90 percent chance of winning than after losing a gamble she
had only a 10 percent chance of winning. Because decisionmakers are
aware of this beforehand, they take it into account when making riskydecisions.' -'
Consider Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Role of Hope in Negotiation, 44 UCLA L Rev
1661 (1997) (explaining how two different conceptions of "hope" can influence negotiation be-
havior); Lopes, 20 Advances Experimental Soc Psych at 264-92 (cited in note 10) (proposing a
motivational theory of risky decisionmaking premised on hope or fear).
" See David E. Bell, Disappointment in Decision Making Under Uncertainty, 33 Operations
Research 1 (1985).
Id at 1.
Id.
Id at 5,9-10. But see Wilco W. van Dijk and Joop van der Pligt, The Impact of Probability
and Magnitude of Outcome on Disappointment and Elation, 69 Organizational Beh & Human
Decision Processes 277,280,282-83 (1997) (finding in an experimental study that the probability
of obtaining a desired outcome did not have a statistically significant impact on subjects' re-
ported feelings of elation).
"' See Bell, 33 Operations Research at 5, 9 (cited in note 151) (suggesting that disappoint-
ment may be directly related to the likelihood of the outcome). See also van Dijk and van der
Pligt, 69 Organizational Beh & Human Decision Processes at 279-83 (cited in note 154) (finding
experimental support for this proposition).
See Bell, 33 Operations Research at 1-2 (cited in note 151) (arguing that decisionmakers
anticipate greater disappointment when results do not match their expectations and may con-
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Consider the implications for plaintiffs making litigation deci-
sions. Suppose that a plaintiff in ordinary litigation faces a 75 percent
chance of winning $20,000 at trial, while a plaintiff in frivolous litiga-
tion faces a 5 percent chance of winning $20,000 at trial. The plaintiff
in ordinary litigation knows she will feel mild elation if she wins at
trial but severe disappointment if she loses at trial, so she is likely to
exhibit risk aversion and accept a settlement offer below the expected
value of trial. The plaintiff in frivolous litigation, by contrast, knows
she will feel extreme elation if she wins at trial and only minor disap-
pointment if she loses, so she is much more likely to exhibit risk-
seeking behavior and reject settlement offers unless they are well
above the expected value of trial. In short, because the prospect of ela-
tion is highest (and the prospect of disappointment lowest) when the
plaintiff's probability of prevailing at trial is lowest, plaintiffs in frivo-
lous litigation are more likely than plaintiffs in ordinary litigation to
opt for trial as a way to maximize elation."
3. Rejoicing > Regret.
The third emotion that might help explain plaintiff risk-seeking
behavior in frivolous litigation is what decision theorists call "rejoic-
ing."'m According to proponents of "regret theory, '59 decisionmakers
seek to maximize feelings of rejoicing and minimize feelings of re-
sider this in evaluating risky choices).
'" For additional work on disappointment in decisionmaking, see J. Jeffrey Inman, James S.
Dyer, and Jianmin Jia, A Generalized Utility Model of Disappointment and Regret Effects on
Post-Choice Valuation, 16 Marketing SCI 97 (1997) (presenting a model of post-choice valuation
incorporating disappointment and regret); Faruk Gui, A Theory of Disappointment Aversion, 59
Econometrica 667 (1991) (using a model to show that risk aversion implies disappointment aver-
sion); Graham Loomes, Further Evidence of the Impact of Regret and Disappointment in Choice
under Uncertainty, 55 Economica 47 (1988) (studying the relative impact of regret and disap-
pointment on individual choice under uncertainty); Graham Loomes and Robert Sugden, Disap-
pointment and Dynamic Consistency in Choice under Uncertainty, 53 Rev Econ Stud 271 (1986)
(using a disappointment-elation function to predict behavior that violates conventional expected
utility theories). See also Marcel Zeelenberg, et al, The Experience of Regret and Disappoint-
ment, 12 Cognition & Emotion 221 (1998) (studying the difference between regret and disap-
pointment).
" See, for example, Robert Sugden, Regret, Recrimination and Rationality, 19 Theory & De-
cision 77,77 (1985) (defining rejoicing as the "pleasurable sensation" a decisionmaker experi-
ences upon learning that her chosen alternative turned out better than the rejected alternative);
Graham Loomes and Robert Sugden, Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice
under Uncertainty, 92 Econ J 805,809 (1982) (describing a "regret-rejoice function").
The leading proponents of modem regret theory are David Bell, Graham Loomes, and
Robert Sugden. See David E. Bell, Regret in Decision Making under Uncertainty, 30 Operations
Research 961 (1982) (formulating a utility function that explicitly incorporates regret); Loomes
and Sugden, 92 Econ J at 805 (cited in note 158) (developing regret theory as an alternative to
Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory of decisionmaking). For an application of modem re-
gret theory to the civil justice system, see Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret
Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior, 1999 U Ill L Rev 43.
[67:163
Framing Frivolous Litigation
gret.'6 Regret theory posits that after making a decision, decisionmak-
ers compare what they obtained to what they could have obtained if
they had decided differently.6' If the choice they made turned out bet-
ter than the alternative, they experience feelings of rejoicing, but if a
different choice would have led to a better outcome, they feel regret.'3
Because decisionmakers are aware of this beforehand, they factor it
into their decisionmaking and seek to maximize rejoicing and mini-
mize regret.
The magnitude of rejoicing or regret a decisionmaker feels de-
pends upon the difference between the outcome of the option se-
lected and the outcome of the option rejected." A plaintiff who wins
$10,000 at trial will experience more rejoicing if he rejected a $500 set-
tlement offer than if he rejected a $5,000 settlement offer. By contrast,
a plaintiff who recovers $0 at trial will experience less regret if he re-
jected a $500 settlement offer than if he rejected a $5,000 settlement
offer. Thus, plaintiffs in frivolous litigation generally face the prospect
of much greater rejoicing and much less regret than plaintiffs in ordi-
nary litigation' because of the likely differences between trial and set-
tlement.'6
For plaintiffs in frivolous litigation, in short, the prospect of hope,
elation, and rejoicing looms large, while the threat of fear, disappoint-
ment, and regret fades into the background. The salience of these
more positive motivational or emotional forces may explain plaintiffs'
unexpected risk-seeking behavior in frivolous suits.
" See, for example, Bell, 30 Operations Research at 963 (cited in note 159) (arguing that de-
cisionmakers make tradeoffs between regret and the value of assets in making risky choices);
Loomes and Sugden, 92 Econ J at 809 (cited in note 158) (using the theory "that [an] individual
chooses between actions so as to maximise the mathematical expectation of modified utility
[which includes regret and rejoice factors]").
"See Richard P. Larrick and Terry L. Boles, Avoiding Regret in Decisions with Feedback: A
Negotiation Example, 63 Organizational Beh & Human Decision Processes 87 (1995) (arguing
that people make ex post comparisons between what they received and what they could have re-
ceived had they chosen differently); Sugden, 19 Theory & Decision at 77 (cited in note 158) (con-
tending that once the uncertainty is resolved, decisionmakers compare "what is" with "what
might have been").
" Larrick and Boles, 63 Organizational Beh & Human Decision Processes at 87 (cited in
note 161); Sugden, 19 Theory & Decision at 77 (cited in note 158).
'. Larrick and Boles, 63 Organizational Beh & Human Decision Processes at 87 (cited in
note 161); Loomes and Sugden, 92 Econ J at 820 (cited in note 158); Sugden, 19 Theory & Deci-
sion at 77-78 (cited in note 158).
'" See Bell, 30 Operations Research at 963 (cited in note 159) (measuring regret "as the dif-
ference between the assets actually received and the highest level of assets produced by other al-
ternatives").
' See, for example, Guthrie, 1999 U Ill L Rev at 72-73 (cited in note 159) (arguing that both
plaintiffs and defendants are likely to prefer settlement to trial in ordinary litigation as a way to
minimize feelings of post-decision regret).
' For additional work on regret in decisionmaking, see id at 62-73.
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C. Explanation #3: Cognitive
Cognitive explanations posit that plaintiffs' risk-seeking behavior
in frivolous litigation is a product of ingrained mental heuristics, infer-
ential tools, or intuitive strategies.'6' "[W]hen faced with the difficult
task of judging probability or frequency," Kahneman and Tversky ex-
plain, "people employ a limited number of heuristics which reduce
these judgments to simpler ones. '  One cognitive heuristic that peo-
ple use to simplify the process of judgment and decisionmaking is the
"salience" or "vividness heuristic."' '
According to the salience or vividness heuristic, decisionmakers
are "much more influenced by vivid, concrete information than by
pallid and abstract propositions of substantially greater probative and
evidential value."'' ° While reliance on salient or vivid information may
sometimes aid decisionmaking,"1 ' the problem with its use is that the
"vividness of information is correlated only modestly, at best, with its
evidential value."'2 Indeed, "vivid information is often misleading,
particularly when duller but more probative information is cast aside
in its favor."'3
In one study, for instance, researchers gave a group of subjects
vivid information about one long-term welfare family and gave an-
other group statistical information painting a more accurate and fa-
vorable picture of welfare families.'7 The researchers found that the
more accurate statistical information "had no effect on subjects'
opinions about welfare recipients," but the vivid description of one
" See Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of So-
cial Judgment 3-8 (Prentice-Hall 1980).
1. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and
probability, in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds, Judgment Under Uncer-
tainty: Heuristics and Biases 163 (Cambridge 1982).
' See Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan
L Rev 683, 706 (1999) (contrasting the salience or vividness heuristic with the closely-related
availability heuristic); Shelley E. Taylor, The availability bias in social perception and interaction,
in Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, eds, Judgment Under Uncertainty at 190,192-94 (cited in note
168) (noting generally that cognitive factors appear to produce salience biases that affect judg-
ment); Nisbett and Ross, Human Inference at 8 (cited in note 167) (contending that "people ef-
fectively assign inferential weight to physical and social data in proportion to the data's salience
and vividness").
- Nisbett and Ross, Human Inference at 44 (cited in note 167). See also Kuran and Sunstein,
51 Stan L Rev at 706 (cited in note 169) (noting the phenomenon that "salient or vivid informa-
tion makes a far greater impression than dry or statistical information"); Taylor, Availability Bias
at 192 (cited in note 169) ("Salience biases refer to the fact that colorful, dynamic, or other dis-
tinctive stimuli disproportionately engage attention and accordingly disproportionately affect
judgments.").
" See, for example, Nisbett and Ross, Human Inference at 59-60 (cited in note 167) (identi-
fying some ways in which reliance on salient or vivid information can be helpful).
Id at 60.
Id.
See id at 57-58 (reporting an experiment conducted by Hamill, Wilson, and Nisbett).
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welfare family prompted those exposed to it to develop less favorable
attitudes toward welfare recipients." In another study, researchers
gave one group of college students statistical data- "mean course
evaluations" of psychology courses-and another group more vivid or
salient data-a comparable evaluation of psychology courses deliv-
ered face-to-face by students who had taken the courses.'76 The re-
searchers found that the "[f]avorable base rate information did not
significantly increase course selection and unfavorable base rate in-
formation did not significantly decrease course selection," but "sub-
jects exposed to face-to-face comments were highly influenced."'"
In short, "[p]eople give inferential weight to information in pro-
portion to its vividness. '"'g This means that "highly probative but pallid
information sometimes will be ignored, and conversely, evidentially
weak but vivid information sometimes will have an undue impact on
inferences."'7'
Plaintiffs in frivolous litigation may fall prey to this salience or
vividness bias when weighting their likelihood of prevailing at trial.
Plaintiffs are much more likely to recall reported instances of large
trial verdicts in apparently frivolous suits than other data about the
civil justice system for the simple reason that information about the
former is much more likely to be accessible and vivid than informa-
tion about the latter.
Daniel Bailis and Robert MacCoun, for instance, performed a
content analysis of news magazine articles published from 1980 to
1990 on tort litigation"4 and found that the articles "exaggerate the
proportion of disputes that result in trials,"'8' "overrepresent plaintiff
victories relative to their true rate,"' and publicize jury awards that,
on average, are four to thirty-four times the average jury awards.'
Similarly, Oscar Chase compared personal injury awards reported in
the New York Times and New York Newsday to average awards ob-
tained in New York courts. 4 Like Bailis and MacCoun, he found that
Id.
"See Eugene Borgida and Richard E. Nisbett, The Differential Impact of Abstract vs Con-
crete Information on Decisions, 7 J Applied Soc Psych 258 (1977).
"'Id at 266.
Nisbett and Ross, Human Inference at 62 (cited in note 167).
Id.
See Daniel S. Bailis and Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating liability risks with the media as
your guide, 80 Judicature 64 (1996) (examining 249 articles from popular magazines for coverage
of tort litigation). See also Daniel S. Bailis and Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks
with the Media as Your Guide: A Content Analysis of Media Coverage of Tort Litigation, 20 L &
Human Beh 419 (1996) (providing a more detailed analysis of the same study).
Bailis and MacCoun, 80 Judicature at 66 (cited in note 180).
"'Id.
Id at 66-67.
"'See Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23 Hofstra L
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the media reports vastly misrepresented the likely awards at trial. ' In
1991, for instance, the Times and Newsday reported court awards av-
eraging $12.8 and $9.2 million, respectively,9 yet plaintiffs actually re-
covered average awards of only $85 1,12 8 ."
Comparing media accounts to accurate court data thus demon-
strates that the media exaggerates awards available at trial to plain-
tiffs. For media accounts to influence plaintiff decisionmaking, how-
ever, plaintiffs must actually read or hear about it, and there is some
evidence that they do. In his recent study of Wisconsin lawyers, for in-
stance, Kritzer found that clients obtain information about prospective
cases in three primary ways, two of which are "news reports that are
wildly biased toward the largest cases" and "word of mouth from their
social circle (which is likely to also be based largely on the biased me-
dia reports)." '' ' Kritzer reported anecdotal evidence of prospective
clients bringing such news articles and accounts to their attorneys as
evidence of the worth of their cases."9
While this evidence is admittedly anecdotal, it provides some
support for the proposition that plaintiffs are likely to recall the
widely available, wildly distorted, and vivid information about big-win
lawsuits. Frivolous-sounding cases-like the infamous McDonald's
coffee case o-seem especially likely to linger in prospective plaintiffs'
minds. Because of the availability of vivid or salient information about
big verdicts in frivolous-sounding suits, plaintiffs are likely to over-
weight their probabilities of success in frivolous litigation. Indeed,
scholars have attributed overweighting of low-probability prospects in
general to this phenomenon. '
Rev 763 (1995).
Id at 772-73.
'"Id at 772.
Id at 773.
'"Kritzer, 23 L & Soc Inquiry at 801 (cited in note 114) (internal parenthetical omitted).
One lawyer reported that, "'some clients bring in clippings of somebody who was malprac-
ticed upon' and won a large jury verdict" to illustrate what they expect to receive at trial. Id at
803. Another lawyer reported that "it is amazing how many clients come in and say that they are
not trying to get rich off this case, but think they should get $100,000 for a whiplash or a slip and
fall." Id. Yet another attorney "described the situation of a woman with some questionable soft
tissue injuries who insisted that her case was worth $700,000." Id.1. Despite sounding like a frivolous case, the McDonald's coffee case, Liebeck v McDonald's
Restaurants, 1995 WL 360309 (D NM 1994), was not frivolous by any definition. See Samuel R.
Gross and Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44
UCLA L Rev 1,4-5 (1996).
.. See, for example, McCaffery, 1994 Wis L Rev at 83-84 (cited in note 63) (noting that pros-
pect theory "holds that people systematically (or at least often) overweigh the possibility of
events having a small likelihood of occurring, especially where such events seem 'available' or
obtain 'prominence' by virtue of widespread publicity"); Camerer and Kunreuther, 8 J Pol
Analysis & Mgmt at 572 (cited in note 139) (hypothesizing that "probabilities are presumably
overweighted if the outcome is salient"). See also Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis
of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 Vand L Rev 1653,1658-59 (1998) ("[O]verestimation may occur
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D. Explanation #4: "Rational"
Finally, plaintiffs' risk-seeking decisions in frivolous litigation, like
consumers' risk-seeking decisions to play the lottery, might simply be
"rational."1 2 Rationality, after all, implies a correlation between an in-
dividual's chosen means and her desired ends. ' Given the individual's
chosen ends, we label her conduct "rational" when she selects the
means that will best enable her to obtain those ends.19
Ed McCaffery argues that "a very good many lottery players play
[the lottery] because they want to win large sums of money."'"' "Given
this end, we test for rationality by checking the relationship between
means and end: is playing the lottery a means to the end of acquiring
large sums of money?"' ' McCaffery appropriately answers the ques-
tion "yes," noting that "the simplest and most obvious answer to the
question of why people play lotteries is that they want to get large
amounts of wealth, quickly, and they have limited options for doing
so. "7 McCaffery concludes, in short, that people make the risk-seeking
choice to purchase long-shot lottery tickets "to get what lotteries
rather efficiently, easily and uniquely offer: a shot at instant wealth."' "
Frivolous litigation may offer the plaintiff what lotteries offer the
consumer-a chance at greater wealth than the individual is likely to
obtain all at once from any other source. Thus, plaintiff overweighting
of low-probability chances of prevailing at trial might simply consti-
tute rational, or even opportunistic, risk-seeking behavior (at least in
high-stakes cases, where the plaintiff has a chance to obtain substantial
wealth through a trial judgment that she could not obtain through set-
tlement).
when a risk becomes highly visible or salient to people."); Deborah L. Rhode, Too Much Law,
Too Little Justice: Too Much Rhetoriq Too Little Reform, 11 Georgetown J Legal Ethics 989,1002
(1998) ("Large tort victories are also more readily recalled than cases with more typical facts. As
noted earlier, when events are especially vivid, people tend to overestimate their frequency. The
combined effect of selective reporting and selective recall leads to misperceptions of the likeli-
hood of large verdicts, particularly in tort contexts.").
'" See McCaffery, 1994 Wis L Rev at 93-94 (cited in note 63) (arguing that lottery play may
be "rational").
" Id at 92. See also Posner, 50 Stan L Rev at 1551 (cited in note 53) (noting that rationality
means "choosing the best means to the chooser's ends").
'" See note 193. See also Korobkin and Guthrie, 76 Tex L Rev at 129-36 (cited in note 16)
(noting the importance of the "means-ends distinction" in assessing whether a litigant is behav-
ing rationally in litigation).
"'McCaffery, 1994 Wis L Rev at 93 (cited in note 63).
Id.
Id.
Id. McCaffery's "rationality" argument hinges on the "indivisibility of desired expenditure
items, compounded, perhaps, by constraints on savings." Id at 112. Individuals may behave ra-
tionally when they play the lottery to obtain wealth needed to purchase an indivisible item, like a
particular sports car or a college education, unavailable to them through savings. Id at 99-112.
See also Wakker and Stiggelbout, 15 Medical Decision Making at 182 (cited in note 74).
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E. Conclusion
Whether plaintiffs' overweighting of low-probability prospects in
frivolous litigation is a product of psychophysical, motivational, cogni-
tive, or "rational" forces is, of course, unclear. In all likelihood, some
or all of these forces combine with others19 to produce plaintiffs' psy-
chological taste for risk in frivolous suits. Whatever the explanation,
the Frivolous Framing Theory's observation that plaintiffs in frivolous
litigation are likely to be risk seeking rather than risk neutral or risk
averse provides an important insight into frivolous litigation reform,
which I turn to in the next part of the Article.
"Several other forces may contribute to plaintiffs' risk-seeking behavior in frivolous litiga-
tion. First, in addition to overiveighting their low-probability prospects of prevailing at trial,
plaintiffs may also overestimate their prospects of prevailing. See Kahneman and Tversky, 47
Econometrica at 281 (cited in note 11) ("It is important to distinguish overweighting, which re-
fers to a property of decision weights, from the overestimation that is commonly found in the as-
sessment of the probability of rare events... In many real-life situations, overestimation and
overweighting may both operate to increase the impact of rare events.").
Second, plaintiffs are likely to fall prey to "self-serving" or "egocentric" biases in which they
interpret information in a way that disproportionately favors their own position. This self-serving
assessment of information may increase plaintiffs' risk seeking in frivolous litigation. See Linda
Babcock and George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Bi-
ases, 11 J Econ Perspectives 109 (1997) (reporting research on the impact of self-serving biases
on settlement of disputes); Linda Babcock, et al, Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85
Am Econ Rev 1337,1339-41 (1995) (finding evidence of a self-serving bias in a litigation prob-
lem); George Loewenstein, et al, Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22
J Legal Stud 135,149-53 (1993) (reporting that subjects assessing information from the plaintiff's
perspective rated the information more favorable to plaintiff than did subjects evaluating the
same information from defendant's perspective).
Third, plaintiffs are also likely to fall prey to the closely-related "overconfidence" or "opti-
mism" bias-"the belief that good things are more likely than average to happen to us and bad
things are less likely than average to happen to us." Korobkin and Ulen, 89 Cal L Rev (cited in
note 21). See also Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Per-
spective, in Arrow, et al, eds, Barriers to Conflict Resolution at 45, 46-50 (cited in note 19) (re-
porting evidence of "optimistic overconfidence" in a litigation study); Neil D. Weinstein, Unreal-
istic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J Personality & Soc Psych 806 (1980) (reporting two
studies demonstrating that subjects fall prey to "unrealistic optimism").
Fourth, plaintiffs are more likely to inflate linguistically-expressed low-probability risks (for
example, "very unlikely") than numerically-expressed low-probability risks (for example, "5%").
See Richard Dusenbury and M.G. Fennema, Linguistic-Numeric Presentation Mode Effects on
Risky Option Preferences, 68 Organizational Beh & Human Decision Processes 109, 119-21
(1996) (finding that decisionmakers prefer linguistic presentation of low-probablity gains to
numeric presentation of low-probability gains, suggesting that "[l]inguistic presentation may
cause decision makers to simulate probabilities higher than the information provider intends or
desires").
Finally, ambiguity about the likely outcome may also exacerbate plaintiffs' risk seeking (as
well as defendants' risk aversion) in frivolous litigation. See notes 132,134.
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V. APPROACHING FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION REFORM
Plaintiffs generally hire lawyers to pursue their frivolous or low-
probability claims. 20 Plaintiffs' lawyers typically work on a contingency
fee basis, '0 ' which means that the plaintiffs' lawyer recovers a fee only
if the plaintiff succeeds in obtaining a judgment or settlement.2 Be-
cause the plaintiffs' lawyer's fee depends upon the success of the
plaintiff's case,'0 3 the plaintiffs' lawyer has an incentive to screen out
frivolous or low-probability cases,2 4 and available evidence suggests
that plaintiffs' lawyers do screen out cases," often because they ap-
pear to lack sufficient merit.2'°
- Ron Gilson and Bob Mnookin argue that "the legal system's central institutional charac-
teristic" is that "litigation is carried out by agents." Ronald J. Gilson and Robert H. Mnookin,
Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 Colum L
Rev 509,510 (1994). See also Milton Heumann and Jonathan M. Hyman, Negotiation Methods
and Litigation Settlement Methods in New Jersey: "You Can't Always Get What You Want", 12
Ohio St J on Disp Resol 253,254 (1997) (noting that lawyers "control much of what happens in
lawsuits," including deciding "when someone's grievance can be turned into litigation").
" See Lester Brickman, Contingency Fee Abuses, Ethical Mandates, and the Disciplinary
System: The Case Against Case-by-Case Enforcement, 53 Wash & Lee L Rev 1339, 1349 & n 45
(1996) ("Each year, approximately one million new contingency fee cases are filed."); Deborah
R. Hensler, et al, Compensation for Accidental Injuries in the United States 136 (1991) (reporting
the results of a RAND study showing that 87 percent of accident claimants who hired a lawyer
did so on a contingency fee basis).
- See Herbert M. Kritzer, Rhetoric and Reality... Uses and Abuses... Contingencies and
Certainties: The American Contingent Fee in Operation 4 (1996) ("The standard description of
the contingent fee is 'no win, no pay.' That is, a litigant has to pay his or her attorney only if the
litigant in some sense wins the case.").
The contingency fee agreement shifts the risk of litigation from the plaintiff to the plain-
tiffs' lawyer. See, for example, Murray L. Schwartz and Daniel J.B. Mitchell, An Economic Analy-
sis of the Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, 22 Stan L Rev 1125, 1125 (1970) ("The
contingent fee allows the client to shift some of the risk inherent in his case to the lawyer.").
'-See Kritzer, 81 Judicature at 23 (cited in note 114) (arguing that "the contingency logic
suggests that contingency fee lawyers should reject a large number of potential cases"); Kritzer,
Let's Make a Deal at 75 (cited in note 2) (contending that "the incentive structure for contin-
gent-fee lawyers would not lead one to expect them to take cases that have little chance of suc-
cess if they go to trial"); Kevin M. Clermont and John D. Currivan, Improving on the Contingent
Fee, 63 Cornell L Rev 529,571 (1978) ("Since contingency makes his fee depend on the outcome,
the lawyer would shy away from any case with a probability of success so low that it makes the
case a poor investment.").
='In his recent study of contingency fee lawyers in Wisconsin, for instance, Herbert Kritzer
found that the 400+ plaintiffs' lawyers in his study accepted an average of only 35 percent of
their prospective cases (14,276 of 40,518). See Kritzer, 81 Judicature at 24 (cited in note 114).
While those lawyers devoting relatively more of their practice to contingency fee work were
slightly less selective than those with relatively more hourly business, see id at 26, Kritzer still
found surprisingly high screening rates across the board. Those who devoted 90 percent or more
of their business to contingency fee work, for example, still turned down 40 percent of prospec-
tive cases. Id at 25. See also Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of
the Tort Litigation System-and Why Not?, 140 U Pa L Rev 1147,1190 (1992) (concluding, based
on a review of the evidence available at the time, that "lawyers engage in some filtering of cases
and turn away a large number of them").
'"See Kritzer, 81 Judicature at 27 (cited in note 114) (reporting that plaintiffs' lawyers cited
"lack of liability" as the most common explanation for screening out a case). Undoubtedly, plain-
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Nonetheless, plaintiffs are likely to find attorneys to pursue their
frivolous or low-probability cases for a number of reasons. First, there
is stiff competition among plaintiffs' lawyers, so not all lawyers have
the luxury of turning down prospective clients with shaky claims.m
Second, even plaintiffs' lawyers with busy dockets are likely to file
their share of low-probability cases because they view themselves as
"portfolio managers."a Like investors seeking to maximize invest-
ment outcomes through diversification,N plaintiffs' lawyers with busy
dockets are likely to diversify their client portfolios by taking some
"rational" chances for the sake of high returns.2 10 Finally, plaintiffs'
lawyers may be unable to assess the merits or likelihood of success of
a plaintiff's prospective claim without filing suit and conducting dis-
covery,nl so some plaintiffs' lawyers will take cases that appear to have
a moderate chance of success but turn out later to be low-probability
cases. Thus, even though many plaintiffs' lawyers are likely to weed
out frivolous cases, persistent plaintiffs are likely to find lawyers to
represent them.
Once plaintiffs have retained lawyers to help them pursue their
frivolous or low-probability claims, plaintiffs-not their lawyers-have
authority under the ethical codes governing the legal profession to de-
tiffs' lawyers also screen out potentially frivolous cases because the ethical rules prohibit frivo-
lous filings, see, for example, Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1 (prohibiting lawyers
from advancing frivolous claims or defenses), and because of reputational concerns. See, for ex-
ample, Robert H. Mnookin, Negotiation, Settlement and the Contingent Fee, 47 DePaul L Rev 363,
365 (1998) (contending that lawyers' "concerns about reputation operate to constrain opportun-
ism, at least somewhat"); Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of
Champions or a Market for Champerty?, 71 Chi Kent L Rev 625,670 (1995) (arguing that "'repu-
tational capital' is the single largest asset of many lawyers").
See Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 Wm & Mary L Rev 283, 300
(1998) (noting that "the rising number of lawyers compounds the difficulties of attracting clients,
which heightens economic insecurity"); Kenneth Lasson, Lawyering Askew: Excesses in the Pur-
suit of Fees and Justice, 74 BU L Rev 723, 733 (1994) (contending that "[t]he large number of
lawyers and their hunger for work have contributed to the rise of outlandish lawsuits").
See Kritzer, Rhetoric and Reality at 89 (cited in note 202) ("While I doubt that many con-
tingent fee lawyers have heard of modem portfolio theory, or even think of themselves as man-
aging a portfolio, almost every time I have described the portfolio perspective, the lawyer I was
talking to commented on how it seemed to describe his or her situation.").
See Harry M. Markowitz, Foundations of Portfolio Theory, 46 J Fin 469, 470 (1991) (ex-
plaining that "diversification is a common and reasonable investment practice" because it "re-
duce[s] uncertainty"). See also Kritzer, Rhetoric and Reality at 87 (cited in note 202) (explaining
that the key argument of Markowitz's portfolio theory "is that investors [should] desire to bal-
ance expected return and uncertainty; that is, the utility investors seek to maximize is a combina-
tion of expected return and uncertainty").
See Kritzer, Rhetoric and Reality at 85-93 (cited in note 202) (using modern portfolio the-
ory to understand how contingency fee lawyers approach their cases); John C. Coffee, Jr., Under-
standing the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement
of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum L Rev 669, 705 (1986) (identifying
"portfolio diversification" as "a strategy that permits the plaintiff's attorney, much as any inves-
tor, to reduce the variance associated with an expected return").
", See notes 100-102 (identifying uncertainties inherent in the litigation process).
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cide whether to litigate further or to settle their cases.212 Plaintiffs' law-
yers obviously exert influence over their clients' decisionmaking, but
plaintiffs' lawyers have an ethical obligation to adhere to their clients'
desires in the litigation process." Because plaintiffs in frivolous litiga-
tion are likely to have a desire for risk not shared by the defendants
they have sued,' 4 they are likely to seek judgments or settlements well
in excess of the expected value of their cases. 21 This, in turn, raises
both efficiency concerns (i.e., the civil justice system expends more of
its scarce resources processing relatively less meritorious cases,
thereby detracting from relatively more meritorious cases) and dis-
tributive concerns (i.e., plaintiffs recover disproportionately advanta-
geous settlements or even judgments) that reformers may wish to ad-
dress.
Reformers should base any reform proposals on the positive the-
ory or model that provides the most accurate account of frivolous liti-
gation behavior. The rational actor models provide an elegant frame-
work within which to analyze frivolous litigation, but they make as-
sumptions about litigant decisionmaking that the Frivolous Framing
Theory calls into question. The rational actor models assume that liti-
gants are risk-neutral actors who evaluate prospective gains and losses
in the same way, while the Frivolous Framing Theory demonstrates
that plaintiffs in frivolous suits are risk seeking, that defendants in
frivolous suits are risk averse, and that litigants evaluate gains and
losses differently.
Based on empirical observations about litigants' risk attitudes, the
Frivolous Framing Theory suggests that plaintiffs' tendency to seek
risk in frivolous litigation is likely to promote the filing of frivolous
claims. Thus, the Frivolous Framing Theory recommends that reform-
ers concerned about the frivolous litigation "problem" focus their ef-
forts on plaintiffs' decisions to file, settle, and try frivolous suits, and
cautions that curbing frivolous litigation might be more difficult than
211the rational actor models would suggest.
" See, for example, Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-8 (providing that "[i]n
the final analysis ... the lawyer should always remember that the decision whether to forego le-
gally available objectives or methods because of non-egal factors is ultimately for the client and
not for himself'); id EC 7-7 (providing that "it is for the client to decide whether he will accept a
settlement offer"); Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(a) ("A lawyer shall abide by a
client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter.").
See, for example, Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-101(A) (prohibiting
representation if "the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or rea-
sonably may be affected by his own financial, business, property, or personal interests"); Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(b) ("A lawyer shall not represent a client if the repre-
sentation of that client may be materially limited by... the lawyer's own interests.").
See Part Ill.B.
See Part III.C.
Proponents of the rational actor models are reluctant to propose frivolous litigation re-
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A. Targeting Plaintiff Risk Seeking
Reformers can tackle plaintiffs' risk-seeking behavior either by
combating plaintiffs' tendency to overweight their low-probability
prospects of prevailing at trial or by changing the frivolous litigation
decision frame so that plaintiffs face at least some prospect of loss.
The latter strategy seems more likely to be fruitful than the former.
1. Undermining overweighting.
Whether reformers can successfully counteract plaintiffs' over-
weighting of their long-shot chances of prevailing at trial depends, of
course, on what underlying factor or factors account for that over-
weighting. If, for example, plaintiffs' overweighting is a cognitive phe-
nomenon caused solely by the salience or vividness heuristic,217 re-
formers might be able to provide vivid information about plaintiff
losses in frivolous litigation to counteract the widely available and
vivid media accounts of plaintiff wins in frivolous litigation.21 8 If, by
contrast, plaintiffs' overweighting is a product of psychophysical
forces-if, in other words, plaintiffs overweight simply because of the
way they perceive low probabilities-reformers are likely to have
great difficulty mitigating plaintiffs' overweighting.
2. Changing plaintiffs' decision frame.
Reformers are more likely to have success changing the decision
frame in frivolous litigation so that plaintiffs face at least some pros-
forms based solely on their frivolous litigation models in large part because of their well placed
concern that any reforms they might propose would have a deleterious impact on nonfrivolous
as well as frivolous litigation. See, for example, Bebchuk, 25 J Legal Stud at 19-20 (cited in note
38) (modeling the English Rule but not proposing it or any other frivolous litigation reforms);
Katz, 10 Intl Rev L & Econ at 17-19,26 (cited in note 37) (contending that the adoption of strict
pleading rules, the English rule of litigation finance, or the requirement of a refundable deposit
at filing would likely deter frivolous suits, but noting that "policies proposed to remedy the
problem of frivolous lawsuits generally have undesirable effects on the disposition of genuine
claims"); Rosenberg and Shavell, 5 Intl Rev L & Econ at 5,10 (cited in note 30) (noting that the
adoption of the English rule of litigation finance would deter frivolous suits but not recom-
mending it because of its impact on other suits); P'ng, 14 Bell J Econ at 549 (cited in note 30)
(contending that the English rule would "be an effective deterrent of frivolous suits" but not
proposing its adoption). But see Bebchuk, 17 J Legal Stud at 448 (cited in note 36) (recom-
mending that policymakers strive to reduce informational asymmetries in frivolous litigation as a
means for minimizing the effectiveness of such suits); Bone, 145 U Pa L Rev at 593-94 (cited in
note 1) (proposing a three-step judicial screening approach to curb frivolous suits at the filing
stage).
See Part IV.C.
Indeed, Kritzer explains that attorneys in his Wisconsin study often try to do something
akin to this as a way to dampen client expectations. See Kritzer, 23 L & Soc Inquiry at 803-05
(cited in note 114). But see Loewenstein, et al, 22 J Legal Stud at 140 (cited in note 199) (charac-
terizing "overweighting of vivid information" as a bias in probability judgment "not eliminated
by incentives for accuracy or feedback").
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pect of loss. Due to the way plaintiff-side litigation is financed, plain-
tiffs in frivolous litigation face a low-probability gains frame in which
they have no real prospect of out-of-pocket loss. If reformers were
able to change the decision frame so that plaintiffs faced not a "pure
gains" frame but a "mixed" frame in which they faced some prospect
of loss,211 the reformers could diminish the attractiveness of litigation
to plaintiffs contemplating filing and settling frivolous suits. This "re-
framing" would have both an economic effect (by altering the ex-
pected value of litigation) and a psychological effect (by subjecting
plaintiffs to "loss aversion"22 ) on plaintiff decisionmaking.
To illustrate, reformers could amend ethical codes like the Model
Rules of Professional Responsibility to require plaintiffs to advance
their own litigation-related costs (such as filing fees, service fees, dis-
covery costs). Currently, ethical codes prohibit attorneys from pro-
viding clients with litigation-related financial assistance, but they cre-
ate an exception for the advancement of costs.221 Plaintiffs and contin-
gency fee counsel take advantage of this exception, as plaintiffs' attor-
neys generally advance their clients' litigation costs.2
Although the typical contingency fee agreement specifies that the
plaintiff is ultimately responsible for paying costs, either out of any
proceeds he recovers, or out-of-pocket in the event his case is unsuc-
cessful, m plaintiffs' attorneys "rarely attempt to collect expenses from
personal injury clients, both because it would be impractical and be-
In a "pure gains" frame, plaintiff chooses between prospects with positive expected values
only, while in a "mixed" frame, plaintiff may choose between prospects with positive and nega-
tive expected values. If for example, plaintiff has a choice between a $300 settlement offer and a
5 percent chance at a $6,000 trial judgment that will cost him $400 in litigation expenses that he
has to pay, he faces a choice between one prospect with a positive expected value ($300 settle-
ment) and one with a negative expected value (a $300 expected trial verdict less $400 in trial
costs). When choosing between mixed prospects, decisionmakers often exhibit risk-averse pref-
erences. See, for example, Hershey and Schoemaker, 31 Mgmt SCI at 1226 (cited in note 130);
Hershey, Kunreuther, and Schoemaker, 28 Mgmt Sci at 947 (cited in note 85).
See note 80.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8(e) ("A lawyer shall not provide financial
assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that: (1) a
lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be con-
tingent on the outcome of the matter.").
In their study of California civil jury trials conducted in 1990-91, Gross and Syverud found
that among individual plaintiffs, the attorney advanced the costs in 84 percent of the cases, the
client advanced costs in 11 percent of the cases, and they shared costs in 6 percent of the cases.
See Gross and Syverud, 44 UCLA L Rev at 17 (cited in note 190).
Gross and Syverud, 90 Mich L Rev at 349 n 71 (cited in note 103) ("It [contingent-fee con-
tract] also provides that out-of-pocket expenses of litigation (filing, service fees, the cost of dis-
covery and investigation, expert witness fees, and so on) will be advanced by the attorney, and
recovered from any settlement or judgment. If they are not recovered, the plaintiff is, in theory,
liable to the attorney for these expenses."); Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns
of Contingency Fee Legal Practice, 47 DePaul L Rev 267,270 (1998) (noting that in many states
plaintiffs are liable for expenses regardless of the outcome of the case).
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cause such a practice might drive away future clients. '' =  Thus, as a
practical matter, frivolous litigation is costless for plaintiffs.
If reformers were to amend the ethical rules governing legal prac-
tice to prohibit plaintiffs' attorneys from advancing their clients'
costs-if, in other words, plaintiffs themselves were actually required
to pay their filing fees, service fees, discovery costs, etc.-plaintiffs
might file fewer frivolous or low-probability claims for the obvious
reason that they would fear having to pay costs out of their own pock-
ets. Requiring plaintiffs in frivolous litigation to pay costs, in other
words, would force them to confront the risk of incurring a loss. "[T]o
the extent that plaintiffs are obliged to bear the costs and risks of liti-
gation," Gross and Syverud observe, "they will be more selective in
the cases they pursue. ' s
Suppose, for example, that a prospective plaintiff seeks to file a
frivolous or low-probability claim against a prospective defendant.
Suppose that he meets with a plaintiffs' attorney and learns that the
plaintiffs' attorney will represent him provided he agrees to pay the
attorney one-third of any settlement or judgment ultimately recov-
ered. * Suppose further that the attorney predicts that the prospective
plaintiff has a 5 percent chance of winning $6,000 at trial if he decides
to file suit. Consider the prospective plaintiff's filing decision:
He faces a choice between two options-filing or not filing-with
three prospective outcomes-trial win, trial loss, or status quo.27 If he
does not have to pay the costs of litigation, he will recover $4,000 if he
files and wins at trial ($6,000 judgment less 1/3 attorney's fee) or re-
main in his current financial position if he either opts not to file or if
he files and loses. Under the current costs regime, he faces no prospect
of loss, so he is likely to decide to file suit.
Now suppose the ethical rules prohibit plaintiffs' attorneys from
advancing litigation costs, so the prospective plaintiff learns he will
have to incur $300 in various costs to pursue his litigation. If litigation
costs him $300, he will recover $3,700 if he wins at trial ($6,000 judg-
Gross and Syverud, 90 Mich L Rev at 349 n 71 (cited in note 103). See also Kritzer, 47
DePaul L Rev at 270 (cited in note 223) ("While in many states clients are liable for expenses
regardless of the outcome of a case, the reality is that lawyers who pursue a case unsuccessfully
on a contingency basis seldom collect those expenses (or even seek to collect them).").
Gross and Syverud, 90 Mich L Rev at 380 (cited in note 103).
This appears to be a fairly standard contingency fee. See, for example, id at 349 n 71 (re-
porting that in their study of litigation in California "[t]he typical contingent fee contract for a
plaintiff s attorney in a personal injury case provides that the lawyer will be paid 33% of any set-
tlement at or before the pretrial conference, and 40% of any later settlement or judgment");
Kritzer, 47 DePaul L Rev at 285,286 (cited in note 223) (noting that "[o]ne-third is the 'standard'
contingency fee figure" and reporting that among the contingency fee lawyers in his survey who
employed a flat percentage fee, 92 percent used the 33 percent rate).
For the sake of this simple illustration, I am assuming that plaintiff cannot withdraw his
claim once he has filed it and that plaintiff "knows" defendant will refuse to settle.
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ment less 1/3 attorney's fee less $300 costs), lose $300 if he files and
loses at trial, or remain in his current financial position if he opts not
to file. Under a regime that requires plaintiffs to advance costs, the
plaintiff faces a good chance of losing a small sum money if he pursues
his claim, so he is more likely to opt not to file suit.
Although it is true that the risk-seeking plaintiff is likely to be at-
tracted to that 5 percent chance of recovering a sizeable judgment at
trial, the 95 percent chance he will incur an actual loss (as opposed to
no loss at all) is likely to have a potent impact on his decisionmaking.
The imposition of a prospective loss will obviously have an economic
impact on plaintiffs' view of the attractiveness of litigation because it
will decrease its expected value. The imposition of a prospective loss
will also have a psychological impact on the plaintiff because it will
subject him to the possibility of loss aversion.
Loss aversion, a component of prospect theorym refers to the
well documented empirical phenomenon that losses loom larger than
equivalent gains. Stated differently, "[t]he aggravation that one expe-
riences in losing a sum of money appears to be greater than the pleas-
ure associated with gaining the same amount."' In fact, experimental
work suggests that individuals feel at least twice as much pain over a
given loss as they feel pleasure over the equivalent gain.2 Thus, the
imposition of a prospective $300 cost is likely to feel larger than $300,
suggesting that a modest reform proposal like cost-shifting might af-
fect plaintiffs' frivolous litigation filing decisions in fairly dramatic
ways. Requiring plaintiffs to pay litigation costs, in short, is likely to
change plaintiffs' frame in filing decisions by subjecting plaintiffs to
the threat of a small economic loss that will loom large psychologi-
cally."'
Such a requirement is also likely to change plaintiffs' decision
frame in settlement calculations, encouraging plaintiffs who have filed
-See Kahneman and Tversky,47 Econometrica at 279 (cited in note 11).
Id.
See, for example, Chip Heath, Richard P. Larrick, and George Wu, Goals as Reference
Points, 38 Cognitive Psych 79, 87 (1999) ("Studies of risky choice and riskless choice have pre-
sented converging evidence that losses are weighted approximately two times more than
equivalent gains (the most common values for this 'coefficient of loss aversion' fall between 2
and 4).") (internal citations omitted); Richard H. Thaler, Daniel Kaimeman, and Jack L. Knetsch,
The Endowment Effec4 Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, in Richard H. Ihaler, ed, The Win-
ner's Curse: Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life 63,70 (Princeton 1992) (arguing that the
ratio of the slopes of the value function for small or moderate gains and losses is two to one).
M See also Kritzer,23 L & Soc Inquiry at 811 (cited in note 114) (quoting a plaintiffs' lawyer
describing how the attorneys at his prior firm used litigation costs as a way to deter clients from
filing suit: "We used to regularly try to frighten people into taking settlements that they didn't
want because they were still kind of gung ho on the whole litigation at that point. So when it was
a gray-area case, we used to say, 'Yes, pay us $1,000 and we will file suit.' They wouldn't have the
money, so that would be the end of that. It is a pretty efficient way of getting rid of a case where
you thought you could get them a settlement but it didn't play out that way.").
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frivolous claims to settle in order to avoid paying out-of-pocket costs
as they proceed to trial. Indeed, plaintiffs' lawyers occasionally use the
threat of litigation costs to encourage their clients to settle. Kritzer ob-
serves, for instance, that plaintiffs' attorneys have been known to de-
mand that their clients reimburse litigation costs the attorneys have
advanced to persuade their clients to accept settlement offers defen-
dants have put on the table. "[B]y simply asking the client to provide a
check to cover even the relatively small fees involved in filing the
court case," Kritzer explains, "the client will pause and reconsider his
or her rejection of the settlement offer."' Similarly, if frivolous litiga-
tion reformers were to succeed in amending the ethical codes to re-
quire plaintiffs to pay their litigation costs, plaintiffs would likely be
more inclined to settle frivolous litigation than they otherwise would
be. In short, then, modifying ethical codes to require plaintiffs to ad-
vance their own litigation costs is likely to deter frivolous filings and
encourage the settlement of frivolous cases.
B. Cautions
The need for frivolous litigation reforms of any kind is unclear
because empirical data on the frivolous litigation "problem" is un-
available.23 Moreover, frivolous litigation reforms, like amending the
ethical codes to require plaintiffs to pay their own out-of-pocket costs,
are likely to have a deleterious effect on plaintiffs pursuing relatively
more meritorious cases.2' Even though the costs of litigation are typi-
cally but a fraction of the attorney's fees in any case, many prospective
plaintiffs will lack the resources to pay them. Thus, requiring plaintiffs
to advance costs may deter them from filing relatively more meritori-
ous cases as well as frivolous cases. Thus, reformers should amend the
rules governing the advancement of costs only if they are able to de-
termine that there really is a frivolous litigation "problem" and that
the benefits of deterring frivolous suits outweigh the costs associated
with deterring relatively more meritorious suits2S
Id at 811. Kritzer notes, however, that "none of the lawyers [he] spoke to acknowledged
that they did this as a means to encourage acceptance of a settlement offer," though "one lawyer
reported that at a firm where he had previously worked this was a fairly regular practice." Id.
"We know remarkably little about frivolous litigation," Robert Bone explains.
"[E]mpirical data is extremely limited, and casual anecdotal evidence highly unreliable." Bone,
145 U Pa L Rev at 520 (cited in note 1). Moreover, reliable empirical data on frivolous litigation
may be unobtainable because there are so "many obstacles to reliable empirical work," id at 527,
including disagreements regarding the definition of frivolous litigation, problems associated with
determining whether any particular suit is frivolous, and difficulties obtaining relevant settlement
data, id at 528.
See, for example, note 216.
Yablon argues that "a rule that will deter frivolous litigation without inhibiting meritori-
ous cases [ ] is simply not attainable. Deterring low-probability claims, by definition, means the
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Whatever reform or reforms may be advanced, reformers con-
cerned about the frivolous litigation "problem" would be well advised
to take account of the positive theory articulated in this Article. Plain-
tiffs in frivolous litigation are likely to exhibit risk-seeking behavior,
and this risk-seeking behavior is likely to encourage pursuit of frivo-
lous claims. Reformers should thus focus their efforts on plaintiffs'
risk-seeking tendencies, either by attempting to counteract plaintiffs'
overweighting of their long-shot chances at trial or by attempting to
change the decision frame so that plaintiffs face some prospect of loss
at trial.
CONCLUSION
Litigation presents litigants with different decision frames that
vary depending upon each party's valuation of the litigation options as
gains or losses and on each party's estimate of the likelihood of win-
ning or losing at trial. Thus, a litigant's view of litigation will depend
upon whether she is a plaintiff or defendant and whether she thinks
she has a good chance or a not-so-good chance of prevailing at trial.
The Framing Theory predicts that plaintiffs in ordinary litigation,
who typically choose between a certain settlement offer and a moder-
ate-to-high probability of prevailing at trial, are likely to prefer set-
tlement, while defendants, who typically choose between paying a cer-
tain settlement amount and facing a moderate-to-high probability of
losing at trial, are likely to prefer trial.2- Because defendants are rela-
tively more likely than plaintiffs to prefer trial in ordinary litigation,
defendants are likely to have the upper hand in bargaining, and re-
formers seeking to promote settlement should target their reform ef-
forts at defendants.28
loss of some meritorious claims." Yablon, 44 UCLA L Rev at 68 (cited in note 98). See also Katz,
10 Intl Rev L & Econ at 26 (cited in note 37) ("[P]olicies proposed to remedy the problem of
frivolous lawsuits generally have undesirable effects on the disposition of genuine claims.").
Bone concedes that any regulatory regime might have a detrimental impact on some meritorious
claims. He argues, however, that the goal of any regulatory regime should not be "to avoid all
adverse effects on meritorious suits," but rather "to strike a sensible balance between the benefit
of reducing frivolous suits and the regulatory costs" Bone, 145 U Pa L Rev at 577 (cited in note1).
See Part II.
See Part II.B.
Korobkin and Ulen, 89 Cal L Rev (cited in note 21).
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The Frivolous Framing Theory proposed in this Article, by con-
trast, predicts that plaintiffs in frivolous or low-probability litigation,
who typically choose between a certain settlement offer and a low
probability of prevailing at trial, are likely to prefer trial, while defen-
dants, who typically choose between paying a certain small settlement
and facing a low probability of losing at trial, are likely to prefer set-
tlement. Because plaintiffs in frivolous litigation are relatively more
likely than defendants to prefer trial, plaintiffs are likely to have the
upper hand in bargaining, and reformers seeking to deter frivolous
litigation or to promote its settlement should target their efforts at
plaintiffs.2°
The Frivolous Framing Theory, in short, enriches both the Fram-
ing Theory of ordinary litigation and the rational actor models of
frivolous litigation by providing insight into the behavior of litigants
embroiled in frivolous suits, perhaps the most visible and controversial
type of suit in our civil justice system.
See Part III.
See Part V.A.
